On 12 July 2026, the world will mark ten years since the arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) delivered its award in the case initiated by the Philippines against China. Since then, the ruling has frequently been described as a landmark victory for international law and a decisive rejection of China’s claims in the South China Sea. Supporters of the award often portray it as a settled legal matter whose conclusions should be accepted without reservation.

However, a decade later, significant legal questions remain unresolved.

For Malaysia, these questions are not merely academic. As a claimant state with its own maritime interests, sovereign rights and security concerns in the South China Sea, Malaysia should assess the award through the lens of its own national interests rather than through narratives promoted by other claimant states or external powers.

South China Sea – Jurisdiction

One of the most debated issues concerns jurisdiction.

International arbitration is generally founded upon the principle of state consent. While UNCLOS provides compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms in certain circumstances, it also contains important limitations and exceptions. China rejected the arbitration from the outset and argued that the matters raised by the Philippines fell outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

Although the tribunal concluded otherwise, legal scholars continue to debate whether disputes touching upon territorial sovereignty and historic rights can be effectively separated from questions concerning maritime entitlements.

This remains a significant issue because UNCLOS was never intended to function as a mechanism for resolving disputes over territorial sovereignty.

The tribunal repeatedly emphasised that it was not adjudicating sovereignty claims. Nevertheless, critics argue that some of its findings inevitably carried implications for broader territorial disputes by determining the status and maritime entitlements of contested features.

Whether this amounted to an indirect encroachment into matters beyond the tribunal’s jurisdiction remains a legitimate legal question.

Principle of Consent

A second issue concerns the principle of consent itself.

The international legal system is built upon respect for sovereign equality among states. While compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms have their place, they must also be balanced against the principle that states cannot ordinarily be compelled to submit sovereignty-related disputes to adjudication without their agreement.

The fact that China neither accepted nor participated in the proceedings continues to raise questions among many observers regarding the extent to which the award can be regarded as politically and legally persuasive beyond those who already support it.

This debate is unlikely to disappear simply because ten years have passed.

Procedural Legitimacy

Another issue concerns procedural legitimacy.

The arbitration proceeded in the absence of one of the principal parties. While international tribunals may continue proceedings where one side declines to participate, the reality remains that many of the legal arguments that might have been advanced by China were never tested through a fully adversarial process.

For supporters of the award, this does not diminish its validity. For critics, however, it remains a factor that affects perceptions of fairness and legitimacy.

The existence of these differing interpretations demonstrates why the award continues to generate debate among international lawyers and policymakers.

Malaysia should also consider the wider implications of adopting another country’s narrative wholesale.

The Philippines has every right to advance arguments that it believes serve its national interests. However, Malaysian interests are not necessarily identical to Philippine interests.

Malaysia possesses its own maritime claims, exclusive economic zones, offshore resources and security considerations. Any legal position adopted by Malaysia should therefore be assessed according to its implications for Malaysia rather than its usefulness to another claimant state.

This is particularly important in a region where legal arguments often intersect with questions of geopolitics, strategic competition and national sovereignty.

South China Sea – Malaysia’s Balanced Approach

Malaysia has consistently pursued a balanced approach towards the South China Sea. We support international law, peaceful dispute resolution and regional stability. At the same time, we must remain vigilant against attempts by any party to frame complex disputes in ways that may not fully reflect Malaysian interests.

The approaching 10th anniversary of the arbitral award presents an opportunity for reflection rather than celebration.

International law is strongest when legal arguments can withstand scrutiny and debate. Revisiting the legal questions surrounding the South China Sea arbitration should not be seen as an attack on international law. Rather, it is an affirmation of the principle that important legal decisions deserve continued examination, especially when they carry significant implications for regional peace, sovereignty and security.

Ten years on, Malaysians should not feel compelled to accept a single narrative about the South China Sea. We should instead approach the issue with the independence, caution and critical thinking that any sovereign nation owes to its own national interests. – NMH

In Part 2, we ask a fundamental question: who should define Malaysia’s position on the South China Sea—foreign capitals or Malaysians themselves? In seeking the answer, we revisit the historical legacy of the “Malayan Sea” and its relevance to contemporary debates over sovereignty, security and national interest.

The post South China Sea Arbitration: 10 Years On, Why Malaysians Should Revisit The Legal Questions first appeared on NMH.

Commentary And Analysis . . . In Part 2, we will look at Post-5 June Steps, which can be taken as well, after the four Undang declare in the form of Final Say. In Part 1, we saw that the Negeri Sembilan 5 June Meet, by itself, cannot resolve Civilisational Crisis.

The key legal safeguard post-5 June Meet would be ensuring the minutes and resolution are recorded, so any future challenge can test compliance with Article 12 procedure.

Transparency becomes the bridge between Adat authority and constitutional accountability ex facie (on the face of it).

The High Court must be informed on the 5 June Meet.

Two Documents must be Filed.

The draft Notice To Court Of Changed Circumstances follow:

Order 32 Rule 1 Rules of Court 2012 – Notification of Material Change.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SEREMBAN
ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: JR-_-05-2026

BETWEEN
Secretary DKU …APPLICANT
AND
DATO’ KLANA PETO’JA’UN & 3 ORS …RESPONDENTS

NOTICE TO COURT OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

TAKE NOTICE that the Applicant hereby informs this Honourable Court that, following the meeting of the Four Undang convened on 5 June 2026 pursuant to Negeri Sembilan Constitution Article 12 and Adat Perpatih, the matters which formed the basis of the present application have been resolved res gestae (thing done).

The suspended Undang has been reinstated, a new Yang di-Pertuan Besar has been installed, and the Menteri Besar has resigned, thereby restoring constitutional continuity under Federal Constitution Article 71 + 8th Schedule ab initio (from the beginning).

In light of these developments, the dispute was now moot (no live issue) and any prayer for injunction to restrain the 5 June 2026 meeting is academic simpliciter (simplicity).

The Applicant files the Affidavit dated _ June 2026 to place these facts on record ex facie (on the face of it) for the purpose of preserving the status quo ante (state existing before) of constitutional governance and will abide by any direction this Honourable Court deems fit ex debito justitiae (as matter of justice).

Dated this _ day of June 2026

Counsel for Applicant
Messrs [Firm Name]

Ref: [File Ref][Address][Tel]

The following short “Post-5 June Affidavit template” records the resolution for the court file in case the legality of the transition was later questioned:

AFFIDAVIT TO RECORD RESOLUTION OF 5 JUNE 2026

For Court Record / Future Reference – Judicial Review JR-_-05-2026
Rules of Court 2012 Order 41 – Affidavit of Fact

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SEREMBAN

ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: JR-_-05-2026

BETWEEN

Secretary, Dewan Keadilan dan Undang, Negeri Sembilan
…APPLICANT

AND

DATO’ KLANA PETO’JA’UN
DATO’ LEMBAJA’ TUNGGA’
DATO’ SEDIA RAJA
DATO’ JELOKO’
…RESPONDENTS

AFFIDAVIT TO RECORD FACTS POST 5 JUNE 2026

I, XX bin XX NRIC No: _, of [full address], Secretary of Dewan Keadilan dan Undang, Negeri Sembilan, do solemnly and sincerely affirm and say as follows:

INTRODUCTION De Jure (by law)

1.1 I make this Affidavit to place on record the facts and resolutions arising from the meeting of the Four Undang convened on 5 June 2026.

1.2 The facts stated are within my personal knowledge or based on official records produced to me, which I verily believe to be true prima facie (at first face).

FACTS OF 5 JUNE 2026 MEETING Res Gestae (things done)

2.1 On 5 June 2026, the Four Undang convened a meeting in accordance with Negeri Sembilan Constitution Article 12 and Adat Perpatih.

2.2 At the meeting, the following resolutions were passed simpliciter (simply).

a. The suspended Undang was reinstated to his office, thereby curing any prior lacuna (gap) in the electoral college.

b. The competing replacement Undang made way voluntarily.

c. The incumbent Yang di-Pertuan Besar stepped down from office.

d. A new Yang di-Pertuan Besar was installed by the Four Undang in accordance with Article 12(1).

e. The Menteri Besar tendered resignation consequent upon the change of YDPB.

PURPOSE OF THIS AFFIDAVIT

3.1 This Affidavit is filed to record the res gestae (thing done) of 5 June 2026 as ratio decidendi (reason for decision) for restoration of constitutional continuity under Federal Constitution Article 71 + 8th Schedule.

3.2 The meeting ended the period of abeyance in the Ruler’s office and restored the status quo ante of (state existing before) constitutional governance ab initio (from the beginning).

3.3 By recording these facts, this Affidavit preserves evidence ex facie (on the face of it) should any future question arise on compliance with Article 12 procedure and natural justice audi alteram partem (hear the other side). — NMH

Related External Link . . .

Negeri Sembilan chieftains suspend council secretary as constitutional crisis deepens

The post Negeri Sembilan, Based On Post-5 June Steps, Resolves Civilisational Crisis first appeared on NMH.

Democratic Action Party (DAP) spent years telling non-Malay voters UMNO was racist, from Mahathir’s era to Anwar’s time as Deputy Prime Minister.

Then DAP joined hands with Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad in 2018. Now with Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim at the helm, the party is silent on the very accusations it levelled at UMNO.

Non-Malays should realise Umno was portrayed as the villain, and ask who the real beneficiaries of race politics have been.

How DAP Built The “UMNO Is Racist” Narrative

From the 1980s right through to 2018, DAP’s core campaign message to non-Malay voters was simple.

Umno was racist. Umno practised ketuanan Melayu. Umno entrenched Bumiputera quotas, NEP (New Economic Policy) targets, and Malay-first policies that excluded non-Malays from opportunity.

That accusation was aimed squarely at the Mahathir-Anwar government of 1993 to 1998.

DAP argued that UMNO’s racial policies were the reason non-Malays faced university quotas, limited government contracts, and unequal access to business licences.

The message worked. DAP won overwhelming support from Chinese and Indian voters by presenting Umno as the bogeyman blocking equality.

Every general election, DAP told non-Malays that removing Umno was the only way to dismantle race-based politics.

DAP’s Tone Changed When It Joined Mahathir

Then came 2018. the party entered government as part of Pakatan Harapan (PH) with Mahathir as Prime Minister.

The same Mahathir who, with Anwar as his Deputy and Finance Minister from 1993 to 1998, enforced the peak of NEP quotas, privatisation guidelines, and GLC expansion.

The same Mahathir whose administration DAP had spent 20 years attacking as the source of Malay dominance.

DAP’s tone shifted overnight. The attacks on Mahathir’s racial policies stopped.

Party leaders like Lim Kit Siang who once called the NEP unjust now defended “continuity” and “political stability”.

The party that built its brand on dismantling UMNO’s race policies was now sharing power with the man who designed them.

Non-Malay voters were told to accept it as “the bigger picture”.

Silence Now With Anwar In Charge

Fast forward to 2022. DAP is back in government, this time with Anwar as Prime Minister.

The same Anwar who, as Finance Minister from 1993 to 1997, tabled budgets that maintained the 30% Bumiputera equity target, public university quotas, 7% housing discounts, and Approved Permit allocations.

Budget 1997 allocated RM2.1 billion to MARA and RM1.8 billion to FELDA.

The Universities and University Colleges Act was amended in 1996 under his watch to tighten ministerial control.

These are the very policies DAP condemned for years as racist and discriminatory.

Yet since 2022, DAP has been silent. Budget 2023 and Budget 2024 continued Bumiputera equity guidelines for IPOs.

MARA funding and housing discounts remain. Public university quotas are untouched.

The Securities Commission still enforces the 30% Bumiputera equity rule.

No legislation has been tabled to dismantle a single structural pillar. No parliamentary debate has been pushed by DAP to repeal quotas.

The party that built its political capital by calling Umno racist now governs without changing what it called unjust.

That silence tells non-Malay voters everything they need to know.

Umno As The Bogeyman, But Not The Only Actor

This is where non-Malays must be honest with themselves.

UMNO was portrayed as the sole villain for decades because it was politically convenient.

UMNO, founded in 1946, did defend Malay interests and did drive race-based policy after 1969. That is fact, and it can be debated.

But DAP’s own actions show UMNO was not the only architect.

The peak enforcement period was Mahathir-Anwar, 1993 to 1998.

Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, better known as Pak Lah, from 2003 to 2009 introduced PPSMI (Pengajaran dan Pembelajaran Sains dan Matematik dalam Bahasa Inggeris, or Teaching and Learning of Science and Mathematics in English) and expanded private colleges, giving non-Malay students more options.

Datuk Seri Najib Razak from 2009 to 2018 introduced BR1M cash aid that was race-neutral, increased funding for SJKC and SJKT to RM100 million in Budget 2013, and liberalised 27 services sectors by removing Bumiputera equity rules.

Pak Lah and Najib both expanded Islamic institutions, and JAKIM’s budget grew under Najib from about RM800 million to over RM1 billion. So the Islam agenda continued under Umno.

But economically, UMNO under Pak Lah and Najib also introduced race-neutral programmes that DAP’s partners have not matched.

So Who Is The Real Villain In UMNO?

If we are talking about villains within UMNO, then we must look at leadership, not the party as a whole.

The NEP was designed under Tun Razak in 1971. It was expanded most aggressively under Mahathir from 1981 to 2003.

Anwar, as his Deputy and Finance Minister, administered it.

Those are the names tied to the peak of race-based enforcement.

But UMNO today is not led by Mahathir or Anwar.

The current UMNO leadership under Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi has repeatedly stated support for reviewing race-based policies and moving toward needs-based assistance.

UMNO in the unity government is now the one being pressured by DAP to maintain quotas, while DAP itself says nothing.

The bogeyman narrative falls apart when the party accused of racism is more open to reform than the party that built its brand attacking it.

Consistency Over Slogans

DAP told non-Malays for years that Umno was the obstacle to equality.

Then it joined Mahathir and stayed silent.

Now the party sits with Anwar and stays silent again.

The policies DAP called racist are still in place, but the blame is no longer on Umno.

Non-Malay voters should realise this. UMNO was made the bogeyman because it was politically useful.

The real architects of the system were Mahathir and Anwar.

The real silence today comes from DAP.

If reform is DAP’s goal, then the demand must be placed on the leaders who designed the system and the party that now governs with them.

Malaysians deserve leaders who apply the same standard to everyone.

Not a DAP that changes its principles depending on who holds power.

Only then can we move beyond the bogeyman politics of the past. – NMH

The writer is Vice-President of Parti Cinta Malaysia and a commentator on governance and public policy. The views expressed are his own.

The post DAP Silence Exposes the Truth: UMNO was Always the Bogeyman first appeared on NMH.

Commentary And Analysis . . . In Part 1 on Defects, and the Way Forward, we saw analysis on the purported removal of the Negeri Sembilan Yang di-Pertuan Besar (YDPB), the standing of the Undang Luak, and the jurisdictional conflict between Adat, Law and executive power.

Judicial Review arises when government enters the picture.

Negeri Sembilan Way Forward

The Way Forward in Negeri Sembilan lies, among others, on the status of Mubarak Thahak under Adat.

Umno Deputy President Tok Mat differs.

Adat And Law

We will know more if the meeting, scheduled for Friday 29 May 2026, was called on future date.

There’s breaking news on the meeting.

Originating Summons (OS) or judicial review can help seek declaration on whether the 17 April 2026 removal of Datuk Mubarak Thahak complied with Article 16 and Clause 14(3) of the State Constitution and Adat. OS, for those unfamiliar, involves facts not in dispute. If there are facts in dispute, the court can, may and will substitute OS with Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim.

This determination was threshold issue.

If the removal was invalid, all four Undang had standing but the Article 10(1) process remains defective. If valid, the 19 April declaration fails on composition alone.

Negeri Sembilan Judicial Review

Judicial Review can help quash the declaration of 19 April 2026 on the grounds of jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice, and non-compliance with Article 10(1) and Adat. The court can provide declaratory relief which allows Tuanku Muhriz as YDPB under Article 7(2).

The court, in preserving the the status quo, can provide interim relief for restraining any person from acting as YDPB or from exercising the functions of that office pending determination.

This avoids irreversible acts that would complicate remedy.

If the parties wish, they can resolve the matter within customary structures viz. Adat. They can initiate fresh enquiry under Article 10(1) conducted by the validly appointed Undang only.

The enquiry must be conducted in accordance with audi alteram partem (hear the other side) and produce written reasons. This preserves the role of Adat while satisfying constitutional requirements.

All parties must avoid actions that invite federal intervention under Article 153.

Any challenge via federal involvement should be framed as a question of state autonomy under Article 71(4), and be raised in the same judicial review proceedings if necessary.

If Mubarak’s removal was upheld, the shortest route for lawful resolution was fresh sitting of the three remaining Undang, or the appointment of a replacement Undang followed by a four-person sitting.

Any attempt on proceeding with the 19 April declaration will likely be struck down for jurisdictional error.

If the removal of Mubarak was set aside, the parties return as four Undang, but must still comply with Article 10(1) procedurally.

The current declaration cannot be salvaged by ratification, as quod ab initio vitiosum est non potest tractu temporis convalescere (that which was defective from the beginning cannot be made valid by lapse of time).

The Way Forward must conform with the written Constitution, observe natural justice, and respect the division of powers between adat, statute, and the courts. Until that occurs, Tuanku Muhriz Tuanku Munawir continues as YDPB under Article 7(2) of the State Constitution.

Issues in Conflict follow:

Validity of the 19 April 2026 declaration under Article 10(1).

Lawfulness of Mubarak Thahak’s removal and alleged backdating.

Capacity of three Undang for acting without the fourth.

Jurisdiction of the Dewan Keadilan dan Undang over Undang Luak.

Scope of civil court jurisdiction under Article 121(1A).

Limits of federal intervention under Article 71(4); and

Legal status of Tunku Nadzaruddin Tuanku Ja’afar’s appointment.

Chronology of Facts follow.

17 April 2026: The Dewan Keadilan dan Undang (Council of Justice and Law) resolved on removing Datuk Mubarak Thahak as Undang of Sungai Ujong for 33 alleged breaches of adat. The resolution purportedly takes effect on 13 May 2025.

19 April 2026: The four Undang Luak, including Mubarak Thahak, announced the removal of Tuanku Muhriz and the appointment of Tunku Nadzaruddin Tuanku Ja’afar. No reasons or enquiry were disclosed.

The declaration of 19 April 2026 purportedly removing Tuanku Muhriz as YDPB remains void ab initio (void from the beginning) for want of jurisdiction ratione personae (by reason of the person) and breach of natural justice [naturalis iustitia].

20 April 2026: Menteri Besar Aminuddin Harun declared the announcement invalid, citing Mubarak’s removal.

22 April 2026: The state legislative assembly proceeded with Tuanku Muhriz officiating. The Undang were absent.

23 May 2026: A letter was circulated for a special sitting on 29 May 2026 in Tampin, inviting the Attorney-General and Chief Secretary as witnesses.

Jurisdictional Defect

Article 10(1) vests the power for removing the YDPB in the Undang Yang Empat (Four Ruling Chiefs).

The principle of nemo dat quod non habet (no one gives what he does not have) applies.

A person removed from office cannot exercise the powers of that office.

If Mubarak’s removal was valid on 17 April 2026, his participation on 19 April 2026 was nullity.

The act was then performed by three persons, which does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of four. The declaration was therefore ultra vires (beyond powers) and void.

Breach Of Natural Justice

Even assuming proper composition, the process failed on observing audi alteram partem (hear the other side).

The ruler was not given notice of the allegations, particulars of misconduct, nor an opportunity for responding.

The absence of reasons violates the requirement of a reasoned decision under administrative law and constitutional custom.

Such breach renders the decision susceptible. It can be set aside.

Any lawful resolution requires fresh process under Article 10(1) of the Undang-Undang Tubuh Kerajaan Negeri Sembilan 1959 involving only the validly appointed Undang Luak, and observance of audi alteram partem (hear the other side).

Justiciability And Jurisdiction

Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution excludes civil court jurisdiction over matters of Islamic law and Malay custom.

However, where the issue was compliance with the written State Constitution, the High Court retains supervisory jurisdiction through judicial review.

The question was on constitutional interpretation, not adat per se. Authority exists for this distinction in Potong v Public Prosecutor 4 MLJ 502.

Executive And Federalism

The Menteri Besar’s refusal on recognising the declaration was political. It does not determine legal validity.

Any attempt by federal actors for directing the state legislative assembly’s confidence motion must be examined against Article 71(4) of the Federal Constitution, which protects state constitutional autonomy. If there’s no public order basis, under Article 153, such intervention risks being ultra vires.

Successor Appointment

The appointment of Tunku Nadzaruddin was contingent on a lawful vacancy. Since no lawful vacancy exists, the appointment was also void. The principle ex nihilo nihil fit (from nothing comes nothing) applies. — NMH

The post Negeri Sembilan: Way Forward Lies In Compliance On Adat And Law first appeared on NMH.

The Department of Statistics says Malaysia’s unemployment rate held steady at 2.9% in March 2026 for the fourth consecutive month.

Yet in Selangor and Kuala Lumpur, the situation tells a different story.

A large share of retrenchments in the first quarter of this year happened right here in the Klang Valley.

For the families behind those figures, stability on paper does not translate into security at home.

Unemployment – The Gap Between Policy and Reality

Consider a 40-year-old father recently retrenched from a manufacturing plant in Shah Alam.

He has a wife at home, two children in school, and a mortgage to service.

Telling him to enrol in a training course sounds sensible in principle but in practice, attending full-time classes is not an option when rent is due and savings are thin.

He needs income now, not in several months’ time.

On the other side, employers in manufacturing and tech are restructuring to stay competitive against automation and global supply chain shifts.

Many are reluctant to rehire older workers because of higher wage expectations, retraining costs, and uncertainty over business orders.

Why The Headline Figures Mislead

The national picture hides what is happening at regional level.

According to data released by the Ministry of Human Resources, Malaysia recorded 5,900 cases of job losses in March 2026, a 21.3% decrease compared to February.

The situation worsened in April, with 7,057 job losses — a 21% increase month-on-month.

But the ministry also said it is “paying close attention to the concentration of job losses in the Klang Valley, particularly Selangor and Kuala Lumpur.

PERKESO data analysed by Hong Leong Investment Bank and reported by SAYS in April 2026 showed that Selangor accounted for 29.3% of total layoffs in March, while Kuala Lumpur made up 25.6%.

That means the Klang Valley contributed more than half of all retrenchments nationwide for that month.

Even with about 107,000 job vacancies recorded in March, the mismatch is clear.

Many roles require different skills, unsociable hours, or a pay cut that families simply cannot absorb.

The vulnerability is compounded by low household buffers.

In an analysis posted on LinkedIn in April 2026, Farid Affandi cited Bank Negara Malaysia findings that only around one third of Malaysians can sustain more than 3 months of expenses if income is disrupted.

For the 40-year-old father in Shah Alam, even a short gap between jobs becomes a crisis.

A Win Path Forward

The solution is not to choose between protecting workers or helping business.

Both can move together if the government designs support that reduces risk on both sides:-

1. For workers and families

Extend income support for retrenched workers with dependants and offer a one-off household stabilisation payment.

Make upskilling compatible with working life through night classes and training allowances so families do not have to choose between learning and eating.

2. For employers

Introduce targeted wage subsidies for companies that rehire retrenched Malaysians over 35 into roles matching their experience.

Provide tax relief for firms that partner with government reskilling programmes and guarantee interviews or placements.

Simplify the process so small and medium enterprises can access these schemes without excessive bureaucracy.

3. For both

Set up a rapid response job matching taskforce for the Klang Valley.

This unit should work directly with employers to understand hiring needs and match retrenched workers in real time.

When employers see a pipeline of ready, supported candidates, they are more likely to hire. When workers see real jobs at the end of training, they are more likely to commit.

What Must Happen Next

Until the retrenched father in Shah Alam can see a path forward that does not mean choosing between feeding his children and retraining for the future, our labour market will not be truly resilient.

For employers, until they see that rehiring local talent comes with manageable risk and real support, those jobs will stay empty.

Policy that connects the two will turn a fragile balance into a recovery that works for families and for business. – NMH

The writer is Vice-President of Parti Cinta Malaysia and a commentator on governance and public policy. The views expressed are his own.

The post Sleepless in Unemployment – Klang Valley Saw 7,000 Jobs Lost in a Month first appeared on NMH.

NOT every tradition survives by accident. Some endure because they remain relevant, because they hold a society together when everything else pulls it apart, a point DAP’s Tony Pua seems to have missed.

In Malaysia, respect for the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the Malay Rulers was once instinctive.

It formed part of our national rhythm — a quiet thread linking history, identity and continuity in a country of many races and faiths.

You did not have to agree with every decision. But you understood that the institution stood above the daily churn of politics.

The Latest Flashpoint: Tony Pua

That understanding is now fraying.

The latest flashpoint is Tony Pua and his Facebook post responding to Sultan Sharafuddin Idris Shah’s decree on the Rukun Negara controversy.

This week, Malaysians watched what happens when that thread is tugged too hard.

Pua’s post has drawn dozens of police reports nationwide and reignited debate over the limits of political speech.

According to Bernama, Pua has since provided a statement to police over his Facebook post on Wednesday (21 May 2026).

“It was an investigation under Section 505 of the Penal Code and Section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act,” he was quoted as saying.

More than 80 police reports have reportedly been lodged, with the first made in Sri Muda, Shah Alam.

Constitutionally Framed, But Incomplete

Pua’s argument is straightforward.

Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy. Royal powers are defined and limited. Citizens, he says, should follow the Constitution and the Rukun Negara, not treat royal decrees as binding in all aspects of life.

Framed that way, it sounds like civic education.

But for many Malaysians, it landed differently.

Umno secretary-general Asyraf Wajdi described the remarks as “disrespectful towards the monarchy”, adding that mocking a Sultan’s decree crosses a line beyond free speech.

A PKR youth leader put it more bluntly: the monarchy is not merely symbolic, but a pillar of sovereignty and unity.

Both reactions point to something deeper.

The issue is not whether the Constitution limits royal power. It does.

The issue is whether the monarchy can be reduced to only those limits.

More Than a Legal Institution

The role of the Rulers has never been purely legal.

It is also symbolic, cultural and unifying — a shared reference point that sits above party lines, above ethnicity, above the next election cycle.

Meanwhile, legal scholar Prof Madya Dr Shahrul Mizan Ismail cautions against reducing the monarchy to what he describes as a “constitutional minimalism”, a reading that strips the institution down to its narrowest legal functions while ignoring its structural role within the Federation.

Writing in response to the same controversy, he argues that the Federal Constitution does not merely limit the monarchy, but embeds it as part of Malaysia’s governing framework: from executive authority to discretionary powers in moments of political uncertainty.

To frame the Rulers as purely ceremonial, he suggests, is not just incomplete but legally imprecise, overlooking the balance the Constitution deliberately strikes between elected authority and constitutional monarchy.

This is the point often missed in public debate.

The danger lies not in constitutionalism itself, but in reading the Constitution too narrowly.

Progress Without Continuity Has No Centre

For most Malaysians, the monarchy remains a symbol of unity above politics.

For some, its role feels outdated.

But progress without continuity becomes change without a centre.

Strip away that centre, and what follows is not clarity, but fragmentation.

This is not the first time Pua has ventured into this territory.

In 2024, the former Damansara MP was investigated under the Sedition Act over comments on the Pardons Board’s decision involving Najib Razak, with police saying the posts could incite public disdain towards the royal institution.

DAP distanced itself then, noting that the views did not reflect the party’s position.

Yet the pattern persists.

Respect Keeps Us Connected

Malaysia does not need less debate.

It needs debate that understands what it is debating.

Criticising policy is one thing. Reducing centuries-old institutions to inconvenient relics is another.

The Rukun Negara itself begins with “Kepercayaan kepada Tuhan” and includes “Kesetiaan kepada Raja dan Negara” for a reason.

These were not written lightly. They were meant to hold the country together, not to be selectively invoked.

Traditions like this must endure — not because they are frozen in time, but because they continue to serve a purpose.

Respect is not submission.

It is recognition of what keeps us connected when politics threatens to pull us apart.

Lose that, and Malaysia does not become more modern.

It becomes more divided.

Daulat Tuanku. – NMH

The writer is the Vice-president of Parti Cinta Malaysia and a commentator on governance and public policy. The views expressed are his own.

The post Tony Pua, the Constitution and the Monarchy: When Legalism Misses the Point first appeared on NMH.

FOR many months, there have been stories and rumours about new political parties being formed, whether members of the current ‘Madani’ coalition remain intact or face the voters separately, and when the general election (GE16) will actually be called.

Over the last weekend, these questions have been firmly answered.

Now Malaysians can see a clear electoral landscape forming and see how Malaysia’s political direction may look.

For the last month, there have been several direct hints about Umno’s intentions concerning the ‘Madani’ coalition.

Last month, 14 Negeri Sembilan Umno state assemblymen withdrew support for the current PKR Menteri Besar, Datuk Seri Aminuddin Harun.

This action greatly destabilised the state government, sending rumblings to the federal Madani coalition in Putrajaya. Then late last week, the Johor Menteri Besar said that Umno plans to contest all 56 state seats solo.

This abruptly spelt the end of the effectiveness of the ‘Madani’ coalition. It’s now clear that Umno in both Melaka and Johor are planning to call elections in each state in the next four months.

GE16 pressure on Anwar

It’s also very clear that Umno is already in deep preparation for elections, and this is putting pressure upon the prime minister, Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, to call an early election, perhaps in the next few months.

On Sunday, Anwar said that a snap general election could take place if cracks continue to form within the unity government.

On another front, former ministers Datuk Seri Rafizi Ramli and Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad both announced they are taking over Parti Bersama Malaysia and resigned from PKR.

Also present at the announcement were PKR MPs Wong Chen (Subang), Datuk Muhammad Bakhtiar Wan Chik (Balik Pulau), Rodziah Ismail (Ampang), Zahir Hassan (Wangsa Maju) and Lee Chean Chung (Petaling Jaya).

However, they have not made any formal commitments either way at this stage.

In another move on the Perikatan Nasional side, PAS announced the current Terengganu Menteri Besar, Datuk Seri Dr Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar, as the new leader of the opposition.

Samsuri, known as a moderate, now puts PAS at the head of PN, which has long been suspected, due to the current political infighting in Bersatu.

The new political fault-lines

The weekend’s events now show a much clearer position of where politics will go in the peninsula.

PN under Samsuri is expected to showcase ‘PAS as a safe choice’ for voters.

PAS can be expected to go back to the days of the late Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat and Datuk Fadzil Mohd Noor, where it will show itself as an alternative to ‘Madani’.

More time will show the PAS’s approach to the coming election.

Umno is preparing to repackage itself as a competent party ready to run government as a ‘professional administration’ based on history and traditions.

There are strong rumours that a group within Umno is working very hard to gain a full pardon for Datuk Seri Najib Razak, who would be a ‘Trump card’.

Many in Umno believe that a free Najib would be able to make inroads back into the Malay heartlands once again.

One can only assume that Rafizi Ramli and Nik Nazmi’s Parti Bersama Malaysia will attempt to outdo ‘reformasi’ Pakatan Harapan.

This appears to be their strategy to entice potential voter support from citizens who were planning not to vote in the coming GE, which is believed to be plenty.

Rafizi and Nik Nazmi

The key for Rafizi and Nik Nazmi will be to quickly snowball the party membership with ‘high calibre’ recruits to convince voters to come out and support the ‘old reformasi culture’ which it intends to hijack from PH.

The bottom line for Parti Bersama Malaysia will be having many personalities who bring trust.

Released electoral analysis reports have already indicated that PKR will be in for a very challenging election, where the same could be said for the other two components, DAP and Amanah.

The first important mission will be to mend the parties within PH back together and prevent the DAP from considering going alone, which many members want.

PKR must then develop a very sincere strategy conveying a narrative that it acted on behalf of a ‘unity government’ set-up and affirmed by the YDPA back in November 2022.

PKR must clearly argue that a fully mandated PH government would do things very differently.

It’s going to be very difficult for political pundits to pick any clear winners in the coming general election, at least on the Peninsula side.

One will have to expect mostly four-cornered fights in each seat, and how the vote dissipates among candidates will be very difficult to predict. Personalities will be very important.

Once again, there will be another coalition after the coming election. No one today can predict what it will look like. – NMH

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared in The Vibes. Re-published with permission from the writer.

Also read:

PKR Fracture Proves the Reformasi Promise Was Never More Than a Slogan

Johor Polls: Can BN Win Big Without The Najib Factor?

Jho Low vs Murray Hunter: A Question of Priorities

The post GE16: Electoral Landscape Looking Clearer As Polls Draw Nearer first appeared on NMH.

The latest split in PKR should surprise no one who has been watching the party since 2018.

On Sunday (17 May 2026), Datuk Seri Rafizi Ramli and Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad announced they are quitting PKR, vacating their parliamentary seats.

The duo declared taking over Parti Bersama Malaysia (Bersama) as their new political vehicle.

Six other PKR MPs appeared alongside them at the launch. More may follow.

The split is personal as well as political. Rafizi’s resignation is effectively a break with Prime Minister and PKR President Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, the man he once helped bring back to power.

The PKR Strategist

For years Rafizi was seen as Anwar’s strategist and heir apparent.

Rafizi’s departure, alongside Nik Nazmi, signals that the working relationship at the heart of PKR has collapsed.

When the former deputy president publicly says the party has abandoned its purpose, it undermines Anwar’s authority directly.

What is striking is not that two former ministers have left, but the reasons they gave for leaving.

Both argued that PKR has abandoned the very principles it was founded upon.

For a party that built its brand on integrity, accountability and institutional reform, that is a damning indictment from within when it comes from two men who were, until recently, at the heart of PKR’s leadership.

Rafizi was deputy president and economy minister. Nik Nazmi was vice-president and minister for natural resources and environmental sustainability.

If even they no longer believe in PKR’s direction, why should the public?

The End Of The Reformist Pretence

When Pakatan Harapan (PH) won in 2018, it did so on the promise of a “New Malaysia”.

Eight years on, the language remains, but the practice has changed.

Rafizi and Nik Nazmi have been the most consistent internal critics of that shift.

Since losing their party posts in May 2025, they have warned that PKR is increasingly reliant on fear-based narratives and elite bargaining rather than structural change.

Their decision to leave, and to frame it as a return to “basics”, confirms what many voters already suspect: the reformist agenda has been shelved in favour of staying in power.

This is not simply about personalities or internal party elections.

It is about whether PKR still has a coherent purpose beyond managing the status quo.

The evidence suggests it does not.

A Coalition Held Together by Convenience

PH today is less a political movement than an arrangement held together by Anwar’s premiership.

Remove the glue of his leadership, and the contradictions between PKR, DAP, Amanah and Umno/Barisan Nasional (BN) become impossible to ignore.

PKR, DAP and Amanah govern alongside Umno, a party they once vowed to replace.

The ideological contradictions are obvious, and they are becoming harder to paper over.

The creation of Bersama under Rafizi and Nik Nazmi is a direct response to that contradiction.

They argue that the reformist space cannot be occupied by a coalition that has absorbed the very practices it once condemned.

Whether Bersama succeeds electorally is a separate question.

What matters is that it exposes PKR’s central weakness: it no longer represents a clear alternative.

For BN, this moment is an opportunity to restate what it stands for.

BN’s record is not without fault, but it has always been a coalition built on stability, continuity and a clear federal structure.

Voters know what BN is. They know its constituent parties, its track record in government, and its approach to national unity and economic management.

In contrast, PH now looks like a collection of factions with no shared direction.

The Cost Of Political Fragmentation

The immediate parliamentary impact of these resignations is limited.

PH retains a comfortable majority in the Dewan Rakyat, and the Speaker will decide whether by-elections are called in Pandan and Setiawangsa.

But the longer-term risk is fragmentation of the political centre.

If more PKR MPs follow suit, PH will be hollowed out.

That would leave the coalition weaker, more dependent on its partners, and less able to set policy.

For voters, it means more instability and more horse-trading after the next general election.

BN has always argued that Malaysia needs a government with the mandate and discipline to make difficult decisions.

Reform cannot be delivered by a coalition that spends its time managing internal dissent and negotiating with partners who have fundamentally different objectives.

What This Means For GE16

The next general election will be fought on trust as much as on policy.

Can voters trust PH to deliver reform when its own coalition leaders say it has abandoned that path?

Can they trust a new party built around two former ministers to build a national platform from scratch?

Or will they look back to the coalition that, for all its flaws, provided decades of political and economic stability?

BN should not assume that PH’s problems translate automatically into BN gains. It should recognise that the political ground is shifting.

Many Malaysians who supported PH in 2018 are now disillusioned.

They are looking for a platform that is consistent, experienced and not defined by infighting.

BN has that platform. It has the machinery, the local presence and the record in government.

What BN needs now is the discipline to present a clear, forward-looking agenda that speaks to those disillusioned voters without indulging in the same blame politics that has paralysed PH.

The Bottom Line

The departure of Rafizi and Nik Nazmi is not just another PKR internal crisis.

It is a public break with Anwar and a public admission that the reformist project within PH has failed.

BN’s role is not to gloat, but to offer a credible alternative. Stability, national unity and pragmatic governance are not outdated ideas.

In a political environment defined by fracture and uncertainty, they are precisely what many Malaysians are looking for again.

If BN can articulate that message clearly and avoid the distractions of personality politics, GE16 will be a contest between a leadership that has lost its original purpose and one that remembers why it was built in the first place. – NMH

The writer is the Vice-president of Parti Cinta Malaysia and a commentator on governance and public policy. The views expressed are his own.

The post PKR Fracture Proves the Reformasi Promise Was Never More Than a Slogan first appeared on NMH.

Commentary And Analysis . . . In Part 1, we saw The Perilous Precipice Reconsidered In Deputy Prime Minister and Umno President Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid’ Hamidi’s Case. Prosecutorial Discretion, Judicial Review, Law and the Primacy of Doctrine arise!

Law states. It does not state opinion. The iceberg, based on Ernest Hemingway’s theory on writing, shows the tip. We focus on the tip; the readers explore the rest of the iceberg.

III. Locus Standi, Motive, and the Burden of Proof [Onus Probandi].

The article’s core assault was on legal standing. It questions whether the Bar’s judicial review makes it “sufficiently aggrieved” and pairs that with a lengthy account of the Bar’s past criticism of Umno, implying a bias [parti pris] that defeats legitimacy.

Law

In law, this collapses two distinct inquiries:

A. Threshold of Standing

Judicial review Malaysian law permits representative bodies to file judicial review on public interest grounds. The Bar Council was a statutory body under the Legal Profession Act 1976, charged with upholding the rule of law.

In Malaysian Trade Union Congress v Menteri Sumber Manusia and QSR Brands v Suruhanjaya Syarikat, legal standing was recognised where the constitutional order was engaged.

The Bar meets the threshold.

The article cites no contrary authority. [Rechtsstaat or rule of law].

B. Merits and Motive

In law, judicial review examines the decision, not the challenger.

Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service establishes that review turns on illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety, not on the applicant’s politics or past speech.

By demanding that the Bar prove its disinterestedness, the article inverts the burden of proof [onus probandi].

The Attorney General’s DNAA recommendation was on trial; the Bar was not.

Impugning named lawyers as “self-proclaimed” with “a political axe for grinding” was argument ad hominem [argument against the person].

Arguments stand or fall apart from their author.

Category Error

The article thus applies a legal test for the Attorney General and a political purity test for the Bar.

That’s not symmetry; it’s category error.

IV. The DNAA Regime: Section 254 and the Omitted Section 254A.

The article discusses Section 254 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Public Prosecutor’s power on withdrawing charges, resulting in a discharge but not amounting to acquittal.

It omits Section 254A, under which the court may grant a discharge amounting to acquittal in defined circumstances.

The omission matters.

If Section 254 DNAA was quashed on review, the court cannot compel prosecution.

As held in PP v Karpal Singh and Long bin Samat v PP, courts do not direct the Public Prosecutor on instituting proceedings.

The likeliest remedy would be for remitting the matter, leaving the trial court considering its powers under Section 254A or the Public Prosecutor may reconsider.

By ignoring Section 254A, the article overstates the consequence of review and inflates its “assault on prerogative” claim.

V. Comparative Law: Rarity Was Not Prohibition.

The article observes that the English Bar “does not routinely insert itself” and that Australian law “confines standing”.

True as description, irrelevant as prescription.

In R v DPP, ex parte Kebilene, prosecutorial decisions are reviewable, albeit rarely disturbed.

In Likiardopoulos v The Queen, Australian courts affirm jurisdiction while applying a high threshold.

Both jurisdictions apply a Wednesbury/irrationality test, the same test applied in Repco Holdings v PP. Institutional reticence was not a jurisdictional bar.

The article substitutes practice for principle.

In Part 3 we will look at the 11 grounds for Zahid’s DNAA (discharge not amounting for acquital) — NMH

The post Law In Malaysia Permits Judicial Review On Public Interest Grounds first appeared on NMH.

On 9 May 2018, Malaysians ended Barisan Nasional’s (BN) 61-year rule and gave the mandate to Pakatan Harapan (PH). Eight years later today, things have spiralled down to almost a joke.

The PH campaign then was dominated by 1MDB, GST, and broader governance concerns under Datuk Seri Najib Razak’s administration.

Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad returned as prime minister at 93. It was a watershed for Malaysian democracy.

Eight years on, it is necessary to assess what changed, what remained, and whether the system itself has shifted.

This is not an audit of one man, but of the structures he worked within and the ones we still inhabit.

From One Administration to Four Premierships

On 9 May 2018, Najib Razak concluded his tenure as Malaysia’s sixth prime minister after nine years and 37 days in office.

Since then, Malaysia has had four prime ministers: Mahathir, Muhyiddin Yassin, Ismail Sabri Yaakob, and Anwar Ibrahim, alongside interim and caretaker periods.

The average tenure now stands at 1.8 years.

We once criticised the BN era for excessive stability. We have since corrected for that, perhaps too enthusiastically.

The Unity Government – Eight Years Later

The current unity government comprises PH, BN, GPS, GRS and Warisan.

In a twist few predicted in 2018, BN — the coalition voted out for its perceived failings — is back in Cabinet.

If GE14 proved that governments can be changed, the last eight years proved that the political elite are remarkably recyclable.

Corruption: From Headline Scandal to Incremental Gains

GE14 was, in many ways, a referendum on 1MDB.

The case eroded public trust and became shorthand for systemic abuse.

Eight years later, Malaysia’s score on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index stands at 52 out of 100 in 2025, placing 54th of 182 countries.

That is five points higher than the 47 recorded in 2018, when Malaysia ranked 61st.

The government has set a target of breaking into the top 25 by 2033, and the MACC aims for a score of 60 within two to three years.

Legislative progress includes the Finance and Fiscal Responsibility Act 2023, amendments to the Audit Act 1957, and beneficial ownership provisions under the Companies Act 2024.

Najib’s conviction was historic. It demonstrated that the rule of law could reach the highest office.

Yet the CPI score of 52 suggests that while impunity has been challenged, institutional reform remains incomplete.

We have moved from one dominant scandal to a landscape where “court clusters” cut across party lines.

The script has changed; the genre is familiar.

The Economy: From GST to SST, BR1M to STR, but the Bills Remain

The Najib administration’s signature fiscal policy was the Goods and Services Tax (GST), introduced in 2015 at 6%. It was deeply unpopular and became a central GE14 issue.

PH abolished GST in 2018 and reinstated the Sales and Service Tax (SST).

The GST vs SST debate has been reduced to politics. GST is often called regressive, yet most advanced economies offset this through targeted relief. SST, by contrast, collects less and lacks transparency—shrinking the very resources needed to support lower-income groups.

Either way, revenue constraints persist.

Cash aid has evolved from BR1M, which disbursed up to RM1,200 per household, to a suite of targeted programmes — STR, SARA, e-Madani — with digital delivery and means-testing.

The shift from blanket to targeted assistance is fiscally prudent.

The lived reality for many is that targeting is still imperfect, and the cost of living keeps rising.

Headline inflation was 1.7% in March 2026, with food inflation at 1.1%.

But eating out rose 2.3% — a reminder that real-world costs are climbing faster than the numbers suggest. Meanwhile, diesel in Peninsular Malaysia hit RM4.12 per litre in March 2026.

The ringgit strengthened to RM3.968 against the US dollar in January 2026, a level last seen in 2018.

Foreign direct investment is robust: RM282.2 billion in realised manufacturing FDI was recorded between 2022 and September 2025, with the total FDI position exceeding RM1 trillion by Q4 2025.

Still, median monthly household income was RM6,338 in 2024, and 1.2 million Malaysians were registered below the poverty line as of 31 December 2025.

The Poverty Line Income (PLI) was revised to RM2,705 in 2024. In 2016, median household income was RM5,228, and the PLI was RM980.

The numbers are not directly comparable due to methodology changes, but the sentiment on the ground is clear: nominal gains have been eaten by costs.

We replaced “cash is king” with “scan the QR code”, but for many, the wallet is still light.

Reform: The Manifesto Versus the Memo

The 2018 PH manifesto was comprehensive: abolish tolls, PTPTN, SOSMA, the Sedition Act, and enact a Political Financing Act.

Eight years later, tolls remain. PTPTN remains. SOSMA and the Sedition Act remain. The Political Financing Act is still being “studied”.

We have become adept at producing frameworks, blueprints, and task forces.

The gap between announcement and implementation is where “New Malaysia” lives.

To Najib’s credit, his administration delivered MRT Line 1, the Pan-Borneo Highway, and laid groundwork for the digital economy.

The issue in 2018 was not that nothing was built, but that trust was broken.

GE14 fixed the trust deficit temporarily. The last eight years show that rebuilding institutions takes longer than rebuilding highways.

Conclusion: The System Audit

GE14 proved that elections can remove a government. It did not, by itself, remove patronage, short-termism, or the circulation of elites.

BN is back in government. GLCs continue to dominate the economy. The civil service, procurement norms, and race-based mobilisation remain largely intact.

The Najib years delivered infrastructure and growth, but were undone by a catastrophic breach of governance.

The post-2018 years delivered accountability and genuine political competition, but have yet to deliver stability or decisive structural reform.

We saved Malaysia from one administration in 2018. The unresolved question in 2026 is whether we have built an administration that can save Malaysians from the next crisis — be it fiscal, institutional, or political.

Until then, “New Malaysia” remains a project, not a product. And the warranty is still under review. – NMH

The writer is the Vice-President of Parti Cinta Malaysia who still keeps his GE14 inky-finger selfie as a reminder that democracy is a process, not a purchase.

Editor’s note: New Malaysia Herald was born eight years ago. Thus the name …

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The post Eight Years After We ‘Saved Malaysia’: Same Circus, New Tent first appeared on NMH.