Commentary And Analysis . . . Menteri Besar Datuk Seri Aminuddin Harun, in law, probably cannot advise the Yang di-Pertuan Besar (YDPB), Tuanku Muhriz Tuanku Munawir, on dissolution of the Negeri Sembilan state assembly amidst public standoff with the 4 Undang. The Undang removed the YDPB and also called for the MB’s exit.

The imminent election in Negeri Sembilan will not end the civilisational crisis in the state. The impasse was jurisprudential.

Other issues arise.

The FPtPS (First Past the Post System), inherited from Britain, fell on undemocratic soil in Singapore and Malaysia. It cannot confer consent of the governed for legitimacy and sovereignty.

The EC (Election Commission) can and should hold runoff where no candidate collects at least 51 per cent of the votes counted on D-Day, assuming that at least 51 per cent of the electorate turned up in seats.

Adat Perpatih was law under Article 160 by institutional codification, but subject as per Article 4.

Negeri Sembilan

The crisis in Negeri Sembilan was probably the permanent feature of legal pluralism in Malaysia. It calls for coexistence of systems, reflecting the dharma (duty) of balancing identity, democracy, and the rule of law.

Civilisational Crisis

Again, the resolution, if any, requires runoff reform + modus vivendi (way of co-existence) between Adat and Constitution. Still, that would not end the Civilisational Crisis.

Cause of Action

There should be Originating Summons (OS), the facts not being in dispute, for Declaration by the High Court that FPtPS without runoff violates the spirit of Article 4 on the principle viz. consent of the governed for legitimacy and sovereignty.

The High Court can grant Order of Mandamus which compels the EC on holding runoff within two weeks in constituencies where winner had less than 51 per cent of the votes counted on D-Day, assuming that at least 51 per cent of the electorate turned up in seats.

There should be Declaration that Adat Perpatih, as recorded by the Lembaga Adat, was written law under Article 160.

There should be Judicial Review if the YDPB was removed without hearing, and Undang was suspended. These are breaches of natural justice and Article 4.

There’s Cause of Action against the Menteri Besar being removed by Undang without amendment of the State Constitution.

We know from Ernest Hemingway’s iceberg theory on writing that only one-eighth of meaning was visible.

The visible text was “polls” and “runoff”.

The invisible seven-eighths was the crisis of legitimacy in the form of lawful authority and supreme power expressed as sovereignty.

The visible issue: the FPtPS.

The hidden issue: consent of the governed for legitimacy and sovereignty.

Johor 2022, in digressing a little from Negeri Sembilan, shows that BN (Barisan Nasional) won 40 seats with less than 51 per cent of votes counted in 17 seats, assuming that at least 51 per cent of the electorate turned up in seats. That’s fait accompli (accomplished fate) by plurality. There was no majority.

The Civilisational Crisis was now twofold: Adat Perpatih vs Constitution in Negeri Sembilan, and no mandate under the FPtPS.

The imminent election in Negeri Sembilan cannot cut this Gordian knot. It’s unsolvable problem as they operate on the same undemocratic soil.

The Chronology of Events follow:

Pre-1895: Adat Perpatih governs luak, the riverine territory, and succession in Negeri Sembilan.

Yang di-Pertuan Besar (YDPB) was elected by 4 Undang, the hereditary chiefs.

There was De facto (in practice) law before codification.

1895-1957: British introduce FPtPS (First Past the Post System) for elections. System designed for two-party Britain, but transplanted in multicultural multi-lingual multi-ethnic Singapore and Malaya. There’s mismatch under weltanschauung (world view).

1957: Federal Constitution enacted.

Article 4 declares supremacy.

Article 119 provides elections by FPtPS. There’s no provision for runoff.

Hence, the consent of the governed for legitimacy and sovereignty was assumed, but not measured.

1959: Negeri Sembilan State Constitution recognises YDPB elected by 4 Undang,but silent on removal.

In law, there’s lacuna (gap). It’s not loophole.

1965: National Land Code Section 10 preserves Adat Perpatih for land, based on customary practices or Adat, in Negeri Sembilan. An example of modus vivendi (way of coexistence).

2005: Kerajaan Malaysia v Sagong Tasi affirms Adat rights survive unless expressly extinguished. There’s Principle on continuity.

12 March 2022: Johor State Election. BN (Barisan Nasional) wins 40/56 seats. In 17 seats, winner had less than 51 per cent of votes counted, assuming at least 51 per cent turnout in seats.

There was no consent of the governed for legitimacy and sovereignty. However, the EC (Election Commission) does not hold runoff.

2018-2026: Negeri Sembilan dispute: 4 Undang claim power on removing YDPB, one Undang was suspended, and demand removal of Menteri Besar (MB).

The state government cites Article 16 on the MB.

Again, Polls if called, cannot resolve the Adat Perpatih vs Constitution question in Negeri Sembilan which was plagued by Civilisational Crisis.

In 2026, two crises converge in Negeri Sembilan:

1) the FPtPS, (First Past the Post System) produces, governments without consent of the governed for legitimacy and sovereignty.

2) Adat Perpatih claims institutional codification under Article 160.

The EC has discretion, based on statute and/or good faith on runoffs, but never uses it.

Negeri Sembilan

There are issues in Conflict Between Parties in Dispute in Negeri Sembilan:

Party A: Advocates of Electoral Reforms and Adat Perpatih.

Adat Perpatih

Whether Adat Perpatih was “written law” under Article 160 without Assembly enactment.

Whether FPtPS violates demos (the people) and dharma (duty) in ensuring the consent of the governed for legitimacy and sovereignty.

Whether EC has discretion on holding runoff under Election Offences Act 1954 for curing mandate problem.

Whether 40 seats in Johor 2022, for example, reflect the general will or mere plurality.

Party B: State Government / EC / BN

Whether Article 4 makes Constitution and FPtPS supreme, precluding runoff unless amended.

Whether Article 160 Adat Perpatih claims breach of Article 71 and State Constitution Article 2.

Whether Menteri Besar can only be removed by vote of no-confidence, not by Undang demand.

Whether runoff was beyond powers of the EC without legislative amendment.

There’s Contradiction and Resolution.

Contradiction: Article 119 mandates FPtPS, but the spirit of the age demands consent of the governed for legitimacy and sovereignty.

Article 160 recognises Adat Perpatih but Article 4 makes Constitution supreme.

Resolution: Harmonious construction can read Constitution and give effect for both viz. including Adat Perpatih.

FPtPS, if constitutional, isn’t sacred.

The EC discretion can be read as including runoff as administrative remedy for legitimacy crisis.

Adat Perpatih is law if written, but subject as per Article 4 on procedural fairness. Neither side was wrong; they speak different logic.

Analysis on Issues, Rules and Application.

Issue

Whether Negeri Sembilan polls and Johor 2022 results can confer legitimacy and sovereignty when FPtPS produces undemocratic mandates, whether EC can hold runoff without amendment, whether Adat Perpatih was law under Article 160, and whether this resolves the Civilisational Crisis between customary practices and Constitution.

Rules

Article 4 Federal Constitution: Constitution was supreme. Any law inconsistent was void by the extent of inconsistency with superior law.

Article 119 Federal Constitution: Elections by ballot. FPtPS was method, not entrenched.

Parliament can amend law on elections.

Article 160 Federal Constitution: “Law” includes Adat if written and recognised. The maxim on stand by decided cases requires broad interpretation.

Article 71 Federal Constitution: State Constitution (SC) must provide for Ruler. Negeri Sembilan SC Article 2 ties YDPB with 4 Undang.

Election Offences Act 1954: EC has power on regulating election conduct. Discretion exists but untested for runoff.

Several Common Law Principles apply:

Hear the other side.

Where there are rights, there are remedies.

Express mention excludes others.

There’s reason for binding decisions.

Application

For example, there was no legitimacy in Johor 2022: 40 seats won with less than 51 per cent of votes in 17 seats means the government has no consent of the governed for legitimacy and sovereignty.

Johor isn’t isolated case.

The same phenomenon can be witnessed in Negeri Sembilan, Malacca, Perak, Sabah and Sarawak, among others.

This was just façade viz. outward appearance of democracy. There’s no substance.

In short, FPtPS on undemocratic soil produces rule by few. Polls do not cure this.

EC Runoff Discretion: Article 119 does not prohibit runoff. The EC discretion under Election Offences Act can include runoff within two weeks where no candidate gets at least 51 per cent of votes counted, assuming that at least 51 per cent of the electorate turned up in seats on D-Day.

This is essential condition for consent of the governed for legitimacy and sovereignty.

There’s no amendment needed if framed as administrative rule.

Adat as Law: Lembaga Adat records Undang, Constitution, waris lists, and Tanah Adat registers for satisfying Article 160 “written” test as per Adang Kungan 1997 1 MLJ 418.

Adat was law of it’s own kind.

The Removal of YDPB: Lawful if 4 Undang follow Adat procedure + allowed hearing for the other side.

Suspended Undang must be heard or decision would be rendered void.

Removal of Menteri Besar: No jurisdiction.

Again, Article 16 in the State Constitution governs. Express mention excludes others.

Undang demand for MB’s removal was form of political pressure.

Article 4 Check: Any Adat Perpatih rule violating Article 5 liberty or Article 8 equality can be blue-penciled viz. severed by Federal Court.

This preserves Adat Perpatih while protecting rights. — NMH

The post Negeri Sembilan Polls Will Not End Civilisational Crisis On Adat And Law first appeared on NMH.

Johor voters have seen this movie before. DAP wins big, then confuses a mandate with ownership.

In 2022 they swept 10 seats in Johor on the back of anti Barisan Nasional (BN) sentiment.

Fast forward to 2025, and the script has flipped. After Sabah showed DAP losing every seat they contested, the same arrogance that cost them there is now on display in Johor.

The difference is simple: DAP brings perspective, Onn Hafiz brings performance.

DAP’s Perspective Problem And Failure Of Delivery

DAP in Johor still acts like it is 2018. The messaging is national, the tone is top down, and the ground work is missing.

Seats like Skudai were won with 27k majorities because voters wanted change, not because they signed up for permanent DAP rule.

Four years later, that same seat faces traffic congestion at Taman Universiti, flood mitigation delays in Kempas, and business licence bottlenecks that kill small traders.

The answer from DAP? More press statements, less site visits.

That is arrogance, assuming the 2022 majority is transferable without delivery. Sabah proved it is not.

When a party mistakes presence on social media for presence in the constituency, voters notice.

Constituency service centres that were promised to be open daily are staffed part time.

Resident complaints on drainage, street lighting and illegal dumping get redirected to the local council with no follow up.

Townhall sessions are rare, and when they happen they feel like ceramah, not problem solving.

That is the arrogance of incumbency: we won, so you will wait.

Dapsy’s Arrogance On Full Display

If DAP Johor is detached, Dapsy Johor is worse. Dapsy leaders in the state talk like they own the future of Johor, but their track record is thin.

Instead of fixing potholes or helping traders, Dapsy lecture voters on national ideology and party doctrine.

Dapsy leaders’ Social media posts attack political opponents, but rarely show ground programmes that solve local problems.

The arrogance is in the tone. Dapsy Johor speaks down to voters, dismisses criticism as “cybertrooper” or “political”, and assumes young voters will fall in line because of party brand.

Sabah should have been a warning. Young voters rejected Dapsy candidates there because they saw no work on the ground, only noise online.

Johor Dapsy is repeating the same mistake. Brand is not a substitute for boots on the ground. Arrogance is not a strategy.

How DAP Treated Marina Ibrahim In Skudai

The clearest example is Marina Ibrahim, incumbent ADUN for Skudai since 2018.

Marina won with a huge mandate and has been one of DAP’s most vocal Johor reps on local issues, pushing for accountability and service for residents and businesses.

Yet within DAP Johor she received cold treatment compared to other ADUNs.

Less allocation for constituency work, less platform at state events, and internal pressure to move out of Skudai.

In a letter dated 30 May 2026 to DAP Johor Chairman, Marina revealed she rejected an offer made by DAP Women Chief Teo Nie Ching during a discussion on 17 May 2026 with Andrew Chen Kah Eng, Johor DAP Secretary.

The offer was for Marina to contest Tiram instead of Skudai, with a GLC chairmanship promised if she failed to win.

Marina declined the offer and announced she was quitting politics.

The letter went viral after she shared it in the DAP Johor WhatsApp group.

NST reported on 31 May 2026 that Marina declined to confirm the letter’s authenticity publicly.

This exposes DAP’s hypocrisy. Before GE14, DAP attacked political appointments to GLCs.

After taking power, GLC posts were dangled as a consolation prize to shift a vocal local rep out of her base.

The message to every Johorean: serve the people loudly and DAP will offer you an exit package.

Loyalty to the party line matters more than service to constituents.

Onn Hafiz’s Performance Track And Delivery

Compare that to MB Johor Onn Hafiz. Whether you agree with every policy or not, the man is visible.

Onn shows up for roadworks, flood projects, and local business forums.

The Machap representative speaks Johor’s language: development, investment, jobs.

Under Onn’s watch, Johor has pushed the Johor Singapore Special Economic Zone (JS SEZ) with Singapore and expanded Iskandar Malaysia investments.

Approvals for factories and logistics hubs have been accelerated, with the state government cutting red tape so projects move from announcement to construction faster.

The JS SEZ is being positioned as a game changer for skilled jobs and cross border commerce.

That is ribbon cutting and site visits, not rhetoric.

On the ground, Onn’s administration has focused on delivery voters feel daily.

Flood mitigation projects in Tebrau, Skudai and Pasir Gudang have been fast tracked after years of delay, with drainage upgrades and pump stations prioritised before the monsoon season.

Road upgrades and junction improvements in Iskandar Puteri and Johor Bahru are aimed at cutting traffic congestion that has frustrated commuters for years.

Through “Jom Niaga Johor” and dedicated business facilitation units, SMEs are getting faster approval for licences and permits, something traders say was stuck under the previous administration.

At the same time, more technical and TVET training is being aligned to JS SEZ jobs so Johoreans get first access to employment, not just foreign workers.

Onn has also made “turun padang” his signature style, turning up unannounced at markets, schools and project sites to check progress himself.

Johor Voters See Onn, Not Just His Poster

There is also stronger coordination with Singapore on water, energy and customs to make JS SEZ functional, not just another announcement.

The message from Onn is consistent: fix what is broken, approve what creates jobs, and show up where people live.

It is not just Johor. BN led state governments in Pahang and Malacca run the same playbook: infrastructure delivery, clear timelines, less political drama.

In Pahang, the ECRL alignment through Bentong, Temerloh and Kuantan is framed as a logistics boost, with the state attracting warehousing near stations.

In Malacca, tourism recovery and port expansion in Tanjung Bruas are backed by direct engagement with SMEs and traders.

Even on bread and butter issues, BN states hammer delivery. Flood mitigation, road upgrades in semi urban areas, faster processing for small business licences.

Fix the roads, approve the projects, turn up for constituents. That’s BN’s style.

Voters may be frustrated with the federal government, but they can still see the difference between an ADUN who appears at ground events and one who tweets.

The Johor Choice

If DAP loses Skudai, it will not be BN magic. It will be DAP arrogance meeting Onn’s ground game.

DAP thought perspective and slogans were enough; BN put boots on the ground and delivered projects voters can see.

Dapsy’s arrogance, DAP’s failure to serve after winning big, and the Marina case that exposed GLC hypocrisy are the story here.

Johor’s upcoming polls will be a referendum on performance versus perspective.

Right now, only BN is scoring points where it matters, at the grassroots, with spades in the ground and projects on the table. – NMH

The writer is Vice-President of Parti Cinta Malaysia and a commentator on governance and public policy. The views expressed are his own.

Also read:

PRN Johor 2026: Ujian Pertama BN Tanpa Faktor Najib

DAP Silence Exposes the Truth: UMNO was Always the Bogeyman

PKR Tears Itself Apart While In Power: The Real ‘Reformasi’?

Johor Polls: Can BN Win Big Without The Najib Factor?

The post Johor Polls: Performance Versus Perspective first appeared on NMH.

Commentary And Analysis . . . It’s unlikely that anyone would go against the four Undang in Negeri Sembilan on the 5 June Meet. If true, 5 June Meet would resolve the Civilisational Crisis but only if Post-5 June Steps are taken as well, after the four Undang declare in the form of Final Say. This would be covered in Part 2 (Post-5 June Steps).

The key legal safeguard Post-5 June Meet would be ensuring the minutes and resolution are recorded, so any future challenge can test compliance with Article 12 procedure.

Transparency becomes the bridge between Adat authority and constitutional accountability ex facie (on the face of it).

Negeri Sembilan

If the Four Undang resolve the matter on 5 June 2026 in accordance with Article 12 + adat, the act has strong constitutional legitimacy prima facie (on the face of it) in Negeri Sembilan.

The crisis is resolved through internal mechanisms contemplated by the state constitution.

The would likely treat this as political question settled by the designated constitutional actors, absent proven breach of Federal Constitution Article 4(1).

This scenario illustrates raison d’être (reason for being) for the Four Undang institution: to act as constitutional stabiliser during succession disputes.

Civilisational Crisis

The resolution demonstrates how Adat mechanisms can achieve what litigation cannot — rapid restoration of status quo ante (state existing before) without court intervention on Civilisational Crisis.

For public law, it reinforces that Article 71 + 8th Schedule was satisfied not only by judicial orders, but by functioning state institutions.

The Federal Constitution sets the floor; Adat provides the path.

The following matters arise in the Final Say:

Raja Norazli bin Nordin replaced as Secretary of Dewan Keadilan dan Undang.

Datuk Mubarak Thahak, suspended as Undang Sungei Ujong, comes back.

His replacements Muhammad Faris Johari and Abdul Rahman Limat, nominated by rival factions, make way.

The Yang Di Pertuan Besar (YDPB), Tuanku Muhriz Tuanku Munawir, steps down.

Tunku Nadzaruddin Tuanku Ja’afar takes over as the YDPB.

Menteri Besar Aminuddin Harun resigns.

Negeri Sembilan Way Forward

Again, the 5 June 2026 Meet convened by the Four Undang would probably resolve the Civilisational Crisis in Negeri Sembilan.

The resolution reached by the Four Undang through Adat consultation on 5 June 2026 can restore constitutional continuity ab initio (from the beginning), thereby rendering prior disputes res judicata (the matter rests) and moot (no live issue).

The resolution arises from Adat, Law and the Constitution being on the same page, speaking with one voice, and the Federal government staying out on the Civilisational Crisis.

Civilisational Crisis Framework

Federal Constitution Article 71 + 8th Schedule obliges each state to maintain a constitutional Ruler and institutions sine die (without a day).

The Negeri Sembilan Constitution Article 12 governs installation and removal of the YDPB by the Four Undang in accordance with Undang-undang Tubuh and Adat Perpatih.

The Federal Constitution is supreme under Article 4(1).

The court recognised in Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia that state constitutions and Adat form part of the constitutional structure, provided they do not contravene the Federal Constitution.

Issues arise.

5 June Meet producing lawful transfer of sovereignty and executive authority, ending the lacuna (gap) in governance.

Three Principles Apply

Continuity:

Article 71 + 8th Schedule demands no prolonged abeyance of the Ruler’s office.

Adat as source:

Article 12 NS Constitution recognises Four Undang as electors/installers of YDPB according to Adat. Their collective decision is ratio decidendi (reason for decision) for succession.

Judicial deference:

Malaysian courts traditionally show restraint in internal Adat matters unless there’s clear ultra vires (beyond powers) breach of Federal Constitution. See Chng Suan Tze on causa proxima (proximate cause) review, but also non-justiciability of pure Adat process.

Application:

Restoration of Undang:

If the suspended Undang was reinstated by the Four Undang, the prior removal was cured fait accompli (accomplished fate).

The replacements moving out of the way removes competing claimants. This restores the quorum of electors required under Article 12.

YDPB Transition:

A voluntary step-down by the incumbent YDPB followed by installation of a new YDPB by the Four Undang fulfills Article 12(1). The act becomes res gestae (thing done) of constitutional significance.

MB Resignation:

The Menteri Besar holds office during the pleasure of the Ruler under state constitutional convention. Resignation upon change of YDPB is pari passu (on equal footing) with constitutional practice. No audi alteram partem (hear the other side) issue arises as resignation was voluntary.

Effect on litigation:

Any pending judicial review premised on stopping the 5 June Meet loses locus standi (legal standing) because there’s no live controversy. The doctrine of mootness (no live issue) applies ex debito justitiae (as matter of justice). The June 5 Meet becomes the cure, not the cause.

In Part 2, we will look at Post-5 June Steps, which can be taken as well, after the four Undang declare in the form of Final Say. — NMH

Related Internal Link . . .

The post Negeri Sembilan, Based On Post-5 June Steps, Resolves Civilisational Crisis first appeared on NMH.

Let’s call it what it is. Malaysia’s press freedom is backsliding, and the Madani government’s excuses are wearing thin.

We’re 95th out of 180 countries in 2026, down seven places in a year.

That’s not progress, but a signal that the space for independent journalism is shrinking again, even under a government that promised reform.

The numbers alone don’t tell the whole story. What matters is what happens in newsrooms when the phone rings, when a source goes quiet, or when an editor kills a story not because it’s wrong, but because it’s risky.

Malaysian journalists are rarely beaten in the street, and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) noted a slight improvement in safety for 2026.

But safety from assault means little when legal harassment, police raids, and smear campaigns do the job instead. Cross certain lines and you risk prosecution.

Managed

When the law is used this way, the press stops being a check on power and becomes a managed channel for it.

Two things keep holding us back.

First, the legal framework. The Sedition Act 1948 and the Communications and Multimedia Act (CMA) are still on the books and still being deployed.

The Centre for Independent Journalism (CIJ) recorded a 23 per cent rise in the use of expression-restricting laws in 2025. That’s not deterrence against hate speech. It’s deterrence against scrutiny.

Second, ownership. Strict licensing and concentrated media ownership mean a handful of politically connected groups control much of the sector.

When a publisher’s business interests depend on government goodwill, editorial independence doesn’t stand a chance.

Examples From The Last Two Years

In January 2026, former FMT journalist Rex Tan was arrested after asking about race at a public forum on Palestine.

Tan was investigated under the Sedition Act 1948, Section 505 of the Penal Code, and Section 233 of the CMA.

CIJ said the arrest failed to meet international standards of proportionality and created a chilling effect.

In March 2026, Tamil-language daily’s journalist Kalidas Subramaniam was detained for over 24 hours after reporting on alleged undocumented migrant workers at Kulim Hi-Tech Park.

Police investigated Kalidas for criminal trespass under Section 447 of the Penal Code. CIJ called the arrest disproportionate and alarming.

In 2025, Malaysiakini journalist B. Nantha Kumar was arrested and charged with bribery days after publishing an investigation into an alleged migrant trafficking syndicate at KLIA.

Nantha denied the charge and said he was acting undercover with immigration officials.

In May 2024, Australian blogger Murray Hunter was arrested in Thailand following a request from the Malaysian authorities under the Madani government.

Hunter had written critically on Malaysian politics.

The case raised concerns over the use of foreign jurisdictions to pursue critics beyond Malaysia’s borders.

Social Media Pages Are Targets Too

The pressure now extends to the platforms news outlets rely on.

In September 2025, Malaysiakini’s Facebook and KiniTV pages were suspended for several hours just after the outlet published an investigation into a network of accounts boosting Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s Facebook engagement.

The episode came as the government tightens control over platforms through the licensing regime under the CMA and the new Online Safety Act 2025.

When platforms are made answerable to regulators, the line between moderation and editorial pressure blurs, and newsrooms lose another channel to publish freely.

Press Freedom and the Red Lines

Under Barisan Nasional and former Prime Minister Najib Razak, the media environment was restrictive but more predictable.

Between 2012 and 2017, Malaysia’s RSF rank moved from 141st to 144th. Low, but stable.

Editors knew where the red lines were, and newsrooms could plan.

Outlets like Malaysiakini still published hard-hitting investigations, and elections in 2013 and 2018 were open and combative.

Since 2023 the picture has been volatile.

We went from 73rd to 107th, back to 88th, and now sit at 95th.

Each year brings new interpretations of old laws and fresh cases against journalists.

That unpredictability makes it harder to run investigations and easier to self-censor.

For many who worked through both periods, the Najib years allowed more room to operate day to day.

The Contradiction At The Core

The gap between what’s said and what’s done is the real story here.

Anwar says Malaysia is “maturing” and must give “more open space” for criticism.

Communications Minister Fahmi Fadzil says “journalists have the right to ask any questions.”

But the laws haven’t changed, and the arrests haven’t stopped.

Rex Tan gets investigated for asking about race. Kalidas Subramaniam is detained for reporting on migrant workers. Malaysiakini’s Nantha faces bribery charges days after publishing an investigation.

Even bloggers abroad are not safe, as Murray Hunter’s arrest showed.

You can’t claim to uphold press freedom while using the Sedition Act and Section 233 of the CMA to prosecute reporting that embarrasses the powerful, and while seeking to silence critics across borders.

That’s not maturity. That’s managed messaging dressed up as reform.

If the government wants credibility on this, it needs to do two things: repeal or amend the laws that criminalise speech, and let the Malaysian Media Council operate without political control.

Until then, the quotes from Putrajaya will keep contradicting the files in the courts.

Malaysia’s press freedom won’t be measured by press releases.

It’ll be measured by whether media outlets can publish a story the government wishes hadn’t been written. Right now, many can’t. – NMH

The writer is Vice-President of Parti Cinta Malaysia and a commentator on governance and public policy. The views expressed are his own.

The post Malaysia’s Press Freedom Needs More Than Rankings to Recover first appeared on NMH.

Jho Low: The Fugitive — or a Quiet Return?

More than a decade after the 1MDB scandal erupted, Jho Low remains the most wanted man Malaysia has yet to bring to justice.

Billions were siphoned from a sovereign wealth fund. Global investigations followed. Assets were seized. Yet the alleged mastermind continues to evade capture, with little visible evidence of a sustained, high-intensity manhunt in recent years.

But recent claims have complicated the narrative.

Allegations have surfaced that Jho Low may have quietly entered Malaysia at the end of 2025 to meet authorities — with some reports even suggesting high-level engagement. These claims remain unverified, but police have confirmed they are looking into the matter.

If true, the implications would be profound.

Because it would suggest that the country’s most wanted fugitive was not beyond reach — but, at least briefly, within it.

Murray Hunter: The Man Malaysia Chased

By contrast, the pursuit of Murray Hunter was swift, coordinated — and costly.

The Australian academic and commentator was arrested in Bangkok in September 2025 following a complaint by the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) over alleged criminal defamation linked to his writings.

Authorities are estimated to have spent around RM5 million to secure his arrest, pursue legal action in Thailand, and manage the case across borders.

Although charges were dropped in early 2026 following mediation and an apology, Hunter’s ordeal did not end there.

He is now reportedly pursuing legal action over alleged mistreatment during his detention in Thailand, adding another layer of controversy to a case already criticised by rights groups.

For a single commentator, the machinery of the state moved with notable urgency — and the repercussions are still unfolding.

A Tale of Two Priorities

The contrast is no longer just striking — it is increasingly difficult to defend.

On one hand, a global financial scandal involving billions, and a fugitive whose status remains unresolved — even amid claims he may have been within reach.

On the other, a writer whose criticism triggered cross-border legal action, significant public expenditure, and now potential legal fallout.

Human rights groups have already described the Hunter case as an example of transnational pressure, raising concerns about proportionality and due process.

Critics argue that enforcement appears selective — assertive when dealing with dissent, but inconsistent when confronting large-scale corruption.

Supporters maintain that institutions must act against defamation to protect credibility.

But that argument now collides with a more uncomfortable question: if Jho Low could return — even briefly — why was he not detained?

The Cost of Perception

This is no longer just about Jho Low or Murray Hunter.

It is about credibility.

In an era of tight public budgets, RM5 million spent pursuing a commentator invites unavoidable comparison with the unresolved status of a multi-billion-dollar scandal — and now, with unanswered questions about what authorities knew, and when.

Perception shapes trust. And trust, once eroded, is difficult to rebuild.

Malaysia has shown it can act decisively.

The question now is whether that decisiveness is applied where it matters most. – NMH

Related article:

A Jho Low Pardon Would Make A Mockery of Due Process in 1MDB Case

The post Jho Low vs Murray Hunter: A Question of Priorities first appeared on NMH.

Commentary And Analysis . . . Indeed, it has been alleged that Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, after becoming Deputy President of Umno in 1993, Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi — then Umno Youth chief— for launching blistering attacks on Mahathir, whom he (Anwar) wanted removed. Mahathir, based on loyalty, had been Prime Minister since 1981.

The incumbent Deputy President, Tun Ghaffar Baba, withdrew, Mahathir having probably remained neutral. What followed was a matter of historical record [res gestae].

Sodomy I happened.

The government, based on Anwar’s own words during fiery briefing in 1998 before the media, was depicted as being composed of “spineless creatures.”

Loyalty

Apparently, based on loyalty not being shown, Mahathir advised the police that the report lodged by Anwar’s secretary against a political writer should no longer be kept in view or marked for no further action. The writer listed, in a book, 50 reasons why Anwar should not be Prime Minister.

Betrayal

Anwar’s betrayal could not be forgotten, and was probably never forgiven.

Again, Sodomy I happened.

There was also Sodomy II.

It has been alleged that Mahathir prevailed upon Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak — read Sodomy 2 — for keeping Anwar out of the way. Najib was loyal.

House Arrest

Najib’s house arrest, decreed by the Agong on 29 January 2024, did not happen.

Najib was denied the house arrest. The responsibility lies with Anwar alone.

Of course, by his own admission, Najib did not declare the RM42m in political donation from SRC International, nor other political donation.

The court, taking the line of least resistance, jailed Najib on 23 August 2022, even though he was unrepresented.

Therein the matter stands.

Najib further faces the prospect of additional imprisonment—fifteen years, running concurrently, on 25 charges dubbed 1MDB —after completing jail for the SRC case.

Najib, having been denied remission on the halving of his sentence mentioned in the Pardons Board letter dated 29 January 2024, remains incarcerated.

There was light at the end of the tunnel when Najib obtained stay of execution on the RM1.8b claimed by SRC International.

Habeas Corpus

Habeas corpus arises as one form of remedy.

The Najib family could have filed habeas corpus application on the halving and the discharge and acquittal granted by Federal Court Review Panel Head, Judge Tan Sri Abdul Rahman, on the SRC case.

Neither step was taken.

Alternatively, Najib could have filed an application for judicial review on the remission after halving.

That too did not occur.

Instead, he filed judicial review on house arrest, which he recently withdrew, the matter having been rendered redundant when he was not released on 23 August 2024, based on remission.

There should be focus on securing fugitive Jho Low’s presence through extradition or mutual legal assistance, and on ensuring that any US clemency was conditioned on cooperation that remedies the procedural deficit, not merely on money returned.

All these place the issues in perspective for the commentary and analysis that follow.

Jurisprudential Replique

II. Jurisprudential Reply – Bar Council’s Challenge on the Zahid DNAA.

A. Introduction: Framing a Constitutional Controversy.

GRKumar’s “The Perilous Precipice” defends the Attorney General’s power under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution for discontinuing prosecutions [nolle prosequi].

It characterises the Malaysian Bar Council’s application for judicial review of the discharge not amounting to an acquittal, as an institutional encroachment, a trespass by professional body with alleged bias [parti pris] upon executive terrain.

We can test that thesis by doctrine alone [ratio decidendi].

We take no position on political wisdom or personal culpability.

The sole question was whether the article’s reasoning survives scrutiny under Malaysian public law [jus publicum].

It does not.

Category Errors

The thesis rests on category errors, misreadings of precedent, and an inversion of the burden of proof [onus probandi] in judicial review.

Most acutely, it asks that the court ignore the Attorney General’s motives while inviting the imputation of motives to the challenger, a contradiction in terms [contradictio in adjecto] fatal in any constitutional review.

B. The Nature of Article 145(3): Executive Power, Not Quasi‑Judicial Office.

The article begins by calling the Attorney General’s power a “quasi‑judicial authority” and a “cornerstone of the separation of powers.”

The labels misstate the law.

Character of the Power.

The Federal Court in Public Prosecutor v Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim held that Article 145(3) confers an executive power, not a quasi‑judicial function.

The distinction was not merely academic.

A quasi‑judicial power implies duty on hearing the other side [audi alteram partem] and giving reasons [ratio decidendi].

Executive power, by contrast, was reviewable only for illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety.

The Wednesbury standard, adopted in Rama Chandran v Industrial Court and applied in prosecutorial discretion in Repco Holdings Bhd v Public Prosecutor, governs review.

The article’s mischaracterisation inflates the shield around the Attorney General and narrows the court’s supervisory role beyond what precedent permits.

Separation Of Powers

The article treats the separation of powers as a wall against review.

In truth, the separation was the very reason for judicial review.

As the Federal Court affirmed in Pengarah Tanah dan Galian, Wilayah Persekutuan v Sri Lempah Enterprise Sdn Bhd, the courts are the final arbiters of legality [ultima ratio legis].

When the Bar invokes the supervisory jurisdiction, it does not usurp executive power; it merely requests that the judiciary test whether that power was lawfully exercised.

The Bar initiates, the court decides.

This is the architecture of Article 121(1) of the Federal Constitution, not its breach.

Part 2 will treat Locus Standi, Motive, and the Burden of Proof [Onus Probandi] in greater depth. — NMH

The post Loyalty And Trust Permeate The Zahid-Anwar Relationship first appeared on NMH.

According to the U.S. Justice Department website, fugitive financier Jho Taek Low (Jho Low) has filed a request for a presidential pardon from Donald Trump.

While Jho Low is still at large, former Prime Minister Najib Razak is in Kajang Prison. That contrast alone tells you everything wrong with how the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) case has played out.

Jho Low is the man U.S. prosecutors call the architect of the $4.5 billion fraud that looted 1MDB. He was charged in 2018, fled, and has remained beyond the reach of Malaysian and U.S. law enforcement ever since.

Najib, by contrast, was tried, convicted, and is now serving time for corruption, money laundering and abuse of power tied to the same scandal.

Here is the problem: you cannot have a fair trial against the alleged beneficiary without the alleged mastermind in the room.

Jho Low This, Jho Low That, But Where Is He?

Throughout Najib’s trial in Malaysia, the prosecution’s narrative placed Jho Low at the centre of every transaction.

Tim Leissner, the former Goldman Sachs banker who pleaded guilty in the U.S., testified that Jho Low ran the scheme and invoked Najib’s authority to move the money.

Yet Jho Low never took the stand.

Malaysia maintains a Red Notice for Jho Low is active, but he is not listed publicly and remains at large.”

Najib was left to defend himself against accusations built around a man he could not cross-examine.

That matters. In any adversarial system, the right to confront your accuser and test the evidence is not a technicality. It is the mechanism that separates a conviction from a railroading.

When the central witness is absent, the court is forced to rely on second-hand accounts, emails and inferences about intent. That’s why there were boxes and boxes among the Prosecutors’ files with the title “Hearsay”.

Malaysian courts ultimately found that sufficient, but “sufficient” is not the same as “fair” when the person who could confirm or refute the entire chain of events remains beyond jurisdiction.

What Sentence?

The irony in Jho Low’s application is stark. He has filed for a “Pardon after Completion of Sentence” despite never having faced a sentence.

The DOJ lists the request as pending with no further details.

If granted, the pardon would extinguish U.S. charges and remove any legal incentive for him to ever return and testify.

It would permanently freeze the record in amber, with Najib convicted and Jho Low free.

That is not justice. It is closure by attrition.

A pardon in this case does not merely forgive Jho Low but validates the idea that fleeing jurisdiction and waiting out the news cycle is a viable legal strategy for the wealthy and connected.

Precedents

It tells every future white-collar fugitive that if you hold out long enough, you can negotiate your way out while your co-defendants take the fall.

Supporters will argue it is about Jho Low offering to return hundreds of millions if charges are dropped, but transactional clemency makes sense only when the trade actually serves justice.

Returning money does not restore the process that was denied to Najib, nor does it restore public confidence that the law applies equally.

If the U.S. is serious about the rule of law, it should deny the pardon and cooperate with Malaysia to bring Jho Low back.

The 1MDB saga will not be resolved by forgiving the man everyone agrees ran it.

It will only be resolved when he faces a courtroom and answers the questions Najib was never allowed to ask.

Until then, what we have is not a concluded case. It is a half-tried one, and a pardon would make sure it stays that way. – NMH

The writer is the Vice-president of Parti Cinta Malaysia and a commentator on governance and public policy. The views expressed are his own.

Related articles:

Seven Years After Najib: The Lessons We Haven’t Learned

Black Day For Justice In Malaysia As Najib Begins Sentence

Jho Low Threatened Jasmine Loo Not To Return to Malaysia

The post A Jho Low Pardon Would Make A Mockery of Due Process in 1MDB Case first appeared on NMH.

With less than a week until his retirement, Tan Sri Azam Baki, the Chief Commissioner of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC), has revealed that two individuals are likely to be charged in connection with the RM1.1 billion Arm Holdings deal.

Although Azam kept their names under wraps, speculation has erupted around former economy minister Datuk Seri Rafizi Ramli and his ex-aide, James Chai.

This revelation has ignited intense political chatter across the nation.

The backdrop to this controversy is significant.

In recent months, Azam and Rafizi have been locked in a public spat.

New MACC Leadership

Rafizi has openly challenged Azam’s continued leadership of the MACC, arguing that to rebuild public trust, new leadership is essential.

Azam even acknowledged criticism later in 2023, noting that Rafizi was among those against renewing his contract.

Further fueling the political fire, earlier this year, an international media report sparked serious allegations against Azam.

This prompted the #TangkapAzamBaki movement, increasing calls for his resignation and placing the government under pressure to find a successor.

Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim initially stood by Azam, urging caution against hasty judgement.

However, public pressure mounted, leading to Azam’s pending replacement just before a planned rally demanding his ousting.

Alarm Bells

Now, with days left in his tenure, Azam’s announcement of potential charges against one of his fiercest critics raises alarm bells.

While this situation does not imply that investigations should be halted, it does bring to light essential concerns about timing and intent.

If wrongdoing is discovered in the Arm Holdings transaction, those responsible must face the full force of the law.

No politician, former minister, or public official should be above accountability.

Public Trust

However, justice isn’t only about what happens; it also relies on public trust in the fairness and integrity of the process.

This trust erodes when significant prosecutions coincide with politically charged transitions, especially involving individuals with a history of conflict.

The MACC’s legitimacy stems not just from its legal authority but from the belief of the public that this authority is exercised impartially and for the right reasons.

This distinction is crucial.

Anti-corruption bodies wield substantial powers: they can investigate, compel testimony, and recommend prosecution.

Personal Vendetta

These powers earn public respect only when there is confidence that they are applied in the name of justice, not personal vendettas or political agendas.

Once that perception is compromised, the institution itself begins to suffer.

Anwar rose to power on the language of institutional reforms and to combat corruption.

Malaysians were promised stronger institutions, greater accountability and a break from the political culture that blurred the line between governance and personal power.

Yet episodes like this risk reinforcing the very cynicism that reformasi was supposed to overcome.

A government genuinely committed to institutional reform must understand that credibility cannot depend solely on legal technicalities or procedural correctness.

Public trust also depends on judgment, timing and transparency.

That is why the incoming MACC leadership must approach this case carefully.

The issue now extends beyond the Arm Holdings investigation itself.

MACC Independent?

What is equally at stake is whether Malaysians can trust that anti-corruption enforcement is being carried out independently, professionally and free from political baggage.

If the evidence is strong, let the process proceed transparently and fairly.

If prosecutorial decisions appear entangled with personal feuds, political grievances or last-minute score-settling, then the damage to institutional credibility may outlast any individual case.

Once the public begins to see anti-corruption enforcement as selective or retaliatory, restoring confidence becomes far more difficult than losing it in the first place. – NMH

The writer is the Vice-president of Parti Cinta Malaysia and a commentator on governance and public policy. The views expressed are his own.

The post Is MACC Enforcement Impartial? Azam Baki’s Timing Raises Doubts first appeared on NMH.

Commentary And Analysis . . . Sabah needs new labour package, in October 2026, tabled in Parliament. It can be law by Q3 2027, with the pilot running from January 2028.

The distance between the new labour package and existing law was no longer conceptual. It takes perhaps 40 pages of drafting by the Attorney General’s Chambers (AGC) and the Sabah Attorney‑General (SAG), plus a political deal at the Prime Minister-Chief Minister level.

The legal carpentry was 95 per cent done.

The remaining 5 per cent was the drafting and the negotiation.

The alternative isn’t a different system.

The alternative was the same system wearing a different name, presided over by the same people, extracting the same fees, and leaving stateless families keeping savings in gold until the next rainy day and they head for the pawnshop.

Let the drafting begin on the new labour package. Let the negotiations begin. One without the other fails.

New Labour Package Story

This remains the complete story on the new labour package for Sabah. There are no gaps. There’s nothing left out. Let the work begin.

Malaysia, on May Day in 2026, still has no direct‑hire platform for migrant workers.

The proposed Universal Recruitment Advanced Platform (Turap) remains under evaluation. There has been no final decision.

The existing Foreign Workers Centralised Management System (FWCMS), operated by Bestinet, continues. Ironically, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) found that it operated for six years without a signed contract. It had 24 unauthorised super‑admin users.

The policy vacuum wasn’t a problem for Sabah.

It’s an opportunity for designing a legally coherent, territory-led reform that addresses two distinct population:

Migrant Worker And The Stateless

Population A: Cross‑border migrant workers, holding national passports, enter Sabah via the Calling Visa process.

They are not seeking citizenship.

They are seeking fair recruitment, freedom from debt bondage, and compliance with ILO Convention 97 (Migration for Employment) and ILO Convention 29 (Forced Labour), both of which are binding on Malaysia.

Population B: Stateless residents in the form of IMM13 holders, Kad Burung‑Burung and Census Certificate holders, Bajau Laut, and stateless children.

They have no passport, no country for returning and no legal identity.

They are not foreign workers.

They are already here.

They need work document, bank account, birth certificate for their children, and pathway to citizenship for those children having resided 18 years or more in Sabah.

The conflation of these two population has paralysed policy in Sabah and Malaysia since 16 September 1963.

The complete story separates them, respects the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63), and provides a legislative blueprint that distinguishes between foreign workers (who need fair recruitment, not citizenship) and stateless residents (who need legal identity, not voting rights).

It also answers the sovereignty objection head‑on: foreign workers are not seeking citizenship; stateless persons are not foreign workers; granting legal identity for people who have no other home isn’t loss of sovereignty.

It’s the exercise of sovereignty.

Non-Sabahan

Under MA63, Sabah retains control over entry and residence of non‑Sabahans. Section 65 of the Immigration Act 1959/63 provides that no person shall enter Sabah without the consent of the Sabah Government.

The Delegation of Powers (Immigration) Order 2016 (P.U.(A) 309) vests the Sabah Immigration Director with specific powers viz. issue passes and regulate entry.

The Federal Court affirmed in State of Sabah v Government of Malaysia [2 MLJ 114] that this division was constitutionally entrenched.

However, the issuance of work passes was governed by the federal Immigration Regulations 1963, Regulation 11.

Sabah cannot unilaterally invent a new pass class; it must be gazetted by the federal Minister.

The correct formula: Sabah approves the person; Putrajaya creates the pass. Any reform must be joint. Neither level of government can act alone.

Debt Bondage

Population A migrant workers are currently funnelled through FWCMS/Bestinet.

Bestinet, under FWCMS, receives RM537 million annually.

ILO Convention 97 requires equal treatment with nationals; ILO Convention 29 prohibits debt bondage and forced labour.

The current system – with documented debt bondage, fees extracted from workers before arrival, and lack of a signed contract – prima facie violates both conventions.

Twilight Zone

Population B, stateless residents in the twilight zone, fall into several categories:

IMM13 holders have visit pass under Regulation 11(2). It does not authorise employment (Immigration Circular IM.101/HQ‑G/429/1 Vol.4 2021). There are an estimated 100,000‑200,000 IMM13 holders in Sabah.

Kad Burung‑Burung and Census Certificate holders. These, having older documentation, are also stateless. Many are elderly. A deeming provision would ensure that they receive MyKAS or green MyKad (temporary residence).

Bajau Laut. The ESSCOM (Eastern Sabah Security Command) crnsus recorded about 29,000 Bajau Laut, including 6,000 citizens.

There’s biometric data on approximately 27,000 individuals.

Stateless children, born in Sabah, cannot obtain birth certificates without marriage certificates or police reports. They have no legal identity.

Track 1 . . .

Track 1 for Population A requires federal legislative action with Sabah’s consent.

Track 2 . . .

Track 2 applies for Population B. It isn’t about recruitment, it’s about regularising persons already present, many born in Sabah. — NMH

Related internal links . . .

The post New Labour Package For Sabah From Parliament . . . first appeared on NMH.

Commentary And Analysis . . . The media has reported that the government intends “cutting out agents” through a Government‑to‑Government (G2G) model involving employers’ associations, with no private agents for migrant worker recruitment. In Part 1, we saw that subject matter experts were in consensus that there can be no law against direct migrant worker employment by employers and workers.

That policy, if implemented, requires several legal changes.

Direct Migrant Worker

The Immigration Regulations 1963 must be amended for direct migrant worker recruitment, thereby allowing direct Calling Visa applications by employers, without routing through FWCMS.

The existing MoUs with source countries must be terminated or renegotiated; for example, the Malaysia–Indonesia Memorandum of Understanding that mandates the One Channel System would need replacement.

The FWCMS contract held by Bestinet must be terminated or expire – the contract currently runs runs 2028 or 2031; breaking it requires negotiation or compensation, which has fiscal implications.

The Private Employment Agencies Act 1981 does not mandate agents, but the administrative policies that treat agents as the sole channel must be rescinded.

Until these steps are completed, direct hiring for PLKS categories remains illegal. An employer who reads the consensus in the earlier part and acts on it immediately would be committing an offence under section 55B of the Immigration Act.

Consensus Correct

The consensus was correct as a matter of policy but incomplete as a matter of law.

If the government amends the regulations and allows association‑led recruitment, that model would be lawful.

However, the involvement of associations still requires a legal framework: does the employer contract directly with the worker?

Does the association perform the vetting and referral functions of the former agent?

Is the association licensed under any statute?

In Germany’s Triple Win project, a dedicated implementing agency (GIZ) coordinates the process.

Exemption

Malaysia would need issuing a specific exemption under the Private Employment Agencies Act or gazette a new regulation permitting association‑led recruitment.

There should be no law against direct employment by employers and workers.

However, under current Malaysian law – specifically Immigration Regulations 1963 Regulation 11, the mandatory FWCMS system operated by Bestinet, and existing bilateral MoUs with source countries – direct hiring of general foreign workers was effectively illegal and may result in criminal penalties under section 55B of the Immigration Act 1959/63.

Again, for direct hiring, the government must amend the Immigration Regulations, terminate or renegotiate the relevant MoUs, and replace the FWCMS monopoly with a G2G or association‑led system.

Foreign workers must not enter on tourist passes to seek employment; that remains an offence under section 39(b).

A lawful alternative was a G2G system where employers apply directly for Calling Visas, with vetting by employers’ associations and trade unions in both countries.

This model was permitted under ILO Convention 97 and the Trade Unions Act 1959, but would require new regulations for authorising association‑led recruitment without licensed private agents.

Questions

When analysing any consensus on migration or labour law, we must ask:

Does the consensus describe what those involved wishes the law to be, or what the law actually was?

Is there subsidiary legislation, administrative policy, or an international agreement operating beneath the primary statute?

Is source‑country law a limiting factor that cannot be waived by Malaysia alone?

By distinguishing between moral claims (what should be) and positive law (what is), the consensus will be both principled and useful for policymakers and practitioners.

Good law reform advocacy insists on accurate diagnosis before prescription.

The present foreign worker system was nothing but corruption. The workers lose out.

Others Benefit

The consensus was essentially correct as a description of how the system functions in practice.

However, for complete subject matter expert analysis, three important nuances must be added: who the “others” are, what the evidence shows, and how the system became this way.

The consensus was not hyperbole.

The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) found that the Home Ministry issued Bestinet a letter of acceptance before finalising procurement terms, forcing the government to negotiate a fee increase from RM100 to RM215 per worker – a 115 per cent hike.

Bestinet now receives RM537 million per year or RM3.2 billion over six years.

The system operated for six years without a signed contract.

Meanwhile, the Malaysian Anti‑Corruption Commission (MACC) exposed a “counter setting” scam where a senior Immigration officer controlled approximately 50 officers and agents, with corrupt officers grossing millions annually. MACC seized RM800,000 from just two junior immigration officers’ homes.

The consensus was correct but incomplete.

Others

Bestinet: Founded by a Bangladeshi national granted Malaysian permanent residency, who, according to Bloomberg, selected the 10 Bangladeshi agencies from over 1,000, while political handlers managed the politics.

Bangladeshi agents: At least one worker paid US$4,400; UN experts report fees exceeding official rates by over five times; workers pay up to RM25,000 through debt, often for jobs that do not exist.

Cartel partners: A UN experts report notes “a small number of recruitment agencies operate as a closed syndicate sustained by corruption”.

Rogue employers: Issued quotas for non‑existent jobs, leaving stranded workers “jobless, unpaid, homeless, and at constant risk of arrest”.

Documentation

How “workers lose out” was documented.

Over 100,646 PLKS holders in construction alone became “untraceable” after a legalisation programme.

Eight Bangladeshis were coerced into forced labour in Gua Musang for up to seven months.

One worker, Shofiqul Islam, borrowed $4,400 for a construction job, his employer vanished, and he later died in a derelict building outside Kuala Lumpur.

Global Slavery

The Global Slavery Index ranks Malaysia 12th highest in the Asia‑Pacific for modern slavery, with 6.3 affected per 1,000 people – up from 4.2 in 2016.

The US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report maintains Malaysia at Tier 2, acknowledging that root causes “such as exploitative recruitment systems, debt bondage, and weak monitoring” remain unaddressed.

The present foreign worker system was structured for extracting maximum value from workers through systemic corruption that enriches a cartel of politically connected vendors, recruitment agents, and complicit officials at every level – while workers enter deeper into debt bondage, face widespread exploitation, and have no meaningful recourse.

The UN experts summarise it well: “We are deeply troubled that fraudulent recruitment and the exploitation of migrants remain widespread and systematic in Malaysia.”

The National Action Plan on Forced Labour nears its end with limited progress; “by some measures, the problem has worsened”.

The consensus was not an exaggeration. It is a concise description of a system that has been formally documented as broken. — NMH

The post Direct Migrant Worker Recruitment: Malaysia Needs Specific Exemption Under Act first appeared on NMH.