With less than a week until his retirement, Tan Sri Azam Baki, the Chief Commissioner of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC), has revealed that two individuals are likely to be charged in connection with the RM1.1 billion Arm Holdings deal.

Although Azam kept their names under wraps, speculation has erupted around former economy minister Datuk Seri Rafizi Ramli and his ex-aide, James Chai.

This revelation has ignited intense political chatter across the nation.

The backdrop to this controversy is significant.

In recent months, Azam and Rafizi have been locked in a public spat.

New MACC Leadership

Rafizi has openly challenged Azam’s continued leadership of the MACC, arguing that to rebuild public trust, new leadership is essential.

Azam even acknowledged criticism later in 2023, noting that Rafizi was among those against renewing his contract.

Further fueling the political fire, earlier this year, an international media report sparked serious allegations against Azam.

This prompted the #TangkapAzamBaki movement, increasing calls for his resignation and placing the government under pressure to find a successor.

Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim initially stood by Azam, urging caution against hasty judgement.

However, public pressure mounted, leading to Azam’s pending replacement just before a planned rally demanding his ousting.

Alarm Bells

Now, with days left in his tenure, Azam’s announcement of potential charges against one of his fiercest critics raises alarm bells.

While this situation does not imply that investigations should be halted, it does bring to light essential concerns about timing and intent.

If wrongdoing is discovered in the Arm Holdings transaction, those responsible must face the full force of the law.

No politician, former minister, or public official should be above accountability.

Public Trust

However, justice isn’t only about what happens; it also relies on public trust in the fairness and integrity of the process.

This trust erodes when significant prosecutions coincide with politically charged transitions, especially involving individuals with a history of conflict.

The MACC’s legitimacy stems not just from its legal authority but from the belief of the public that this authority is exercised impartially and for the right reasons.

This distinction is crucial.

Anti-corruption bodies wield substantial powers: they can investigate, compel testimony, and recommend prosecution.

Personal Vendetta

These powers earn public respect only when there is confidence that they are applied in the name of justice, not personal vendettas or political agendas.

Once that perception is compromised, the institution itself begins to suffer.

Anwar rose to power on the language of institutional reforms and to combat corruption.

Malaysians were promised stronger institutions, greater accountability and a break from the political culture that blurred the line between governance and personal power.

Yet episodes like this risk reinforcing the very cynicism that reformasi was supposed to overcome.

A government genuinely committed to institutional reform must understand that credibility cannot depend solely on legal technicalities or procedural correctness.

Public trust also depends on judgment, timing and transparency.

That is why the incoming MACC leadership must approach this case carefully.

The issue now extends beyond the Arm Holdings investigation itself.

MACC Independent?

What is equally at stake is whether Malaysians can trust that anti-corruption enforcement is being carried out independently, professionally and free from political baggage.

If the evidence is strong, let the process proceed transparently and fairly.

If prosecutorial decisions appear entangled with personal feuds, political grievances or last-minute score-settling, then the damage to institutional credibility may outlast any individual case.

Once the public begins to see anti-corruption enforcement as selective or retaliatory, restoring confidence becomes far more difficult than losing it in the first place. – NMH

The writer is the Vice-president of Parti Cinta Malaysia and a commentator on governance and public policy. The views expressed are his own.

The post Is MACC Enforcement Impartial? Azam Baki’s Timing Raises Doubts first appeared on NMH.

Commentary And Analysis . . . Sabah needs new labour package, in October 2026, tabled in Parliament. It can be law by Q3 2027, with the pilot running from January 2028.

The distance between the new labour package and existing law was no longer conceptual. It takes perhaps 40 pages of drafting by the Attorney General’s Chambers (AGC) and the Sabah Attorney‑General (SAG), plus a political deal at the Prime Minister-Chief Minister level.

The legal carpentry was 95 per cent done.

The remaining 5 per cent was the drafting and the negotiation.

The alternative isn’t a different system.

The alternative was the same system wearing a different name, presided over by the same people, extracting the same fees, and leaving stateless families keeping savings in gold until the next rainy day and they head for the pawnshop.

Let the drafting begin on the new labour package. Let the negotiations begin. One without the other fails.

New Labour Package Story

This remains the complete story on the new labour package for Sabah. There are no gaps. There’s nothing left out. Let the work begin.

Malaysia, on May Day in 2026, still has no direct‑hire platform for migrant workers.

The proposed Universal Recruitment Advanced Platform (Turap) remains under evaluation. There has been no final decision.

The existing Foreign Workers Centralised Management System (FWCMS), operated by Bestinet, continues. Ironically, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) found that it operated for six years without a signed contract. It had 24 unauthorised super‑admin users.

The policy vacuum wasn’t a problem for Sabah.

It’s an opportunity for designing a legally coherent, territory-led reform that addresses two distinct population:

Migrant Worker And The Stateless

Population A: Cross‑border migrant workers, holding national passports, enter Sabah via the Calling Visa process.

They are not seeking citizenship.

They are seeking fair recruitment, freedom from debt bondage, and compliance with ILO Convention 97 (Migration for Employment) and ILO Convention 29 (Forced Labour), both of which are binding on Malaysia.

Population B: Stateless residents in the form of IMM13 holders, Kad Burung‑Burung and Census Certificate holders, Bajau Laut, and stateless children.

They have no passport, no country for returning and no legal identity.

They are not foreign workers.

They are already here.

They need work document, bank account, birth certificate for their children, and pathway to citizenship for those children having resided 18 years or more in Sabah.

The conflation of these two population has paralysed policy in Sabah and Malaysia since 16 September 1963.

The complete story separates them, respects the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63), and provides a legislative blueprint that distinguishes between foreign workers (who need fair recruitment, not citizenship) and stateless residents (who need legal identity, not voting rights).

It also answers the sovereignty objection head‑on: foreign workers are not seeking citizenship; stateless persons are not foreign workers; granting legal identity for people who have no other home isn’t loss of sovereignty.

It’s the exercise of sovereignty.

Non-Sabahan

Under MA63, Sabah retains control over entry and residence of non‑Sabahans. Section 65 of the Immigration Act 1959/63 provides that no person shall enter Sabah without the consent of the Sabah Government.

The Delegation of Powers (Immigration) Order 2016 (P.U.(A) 309) vests the Sabah Immigration Director with specific powers viz. issue passes and regulate entry.

The Federal Court affirmed in State of Sabah v Government of Malaysia [2 MLJ 114] that this division was constitutionally entrenched.

However, the issuance of work passes was governed by the federal Immigration Regulations 1963, Regulation 11.

Sabah cannot unilaterally invent a new pass class; it must be gazetted by the federal Minister.

The correct formula: Sabah approves the person; Putrajaya creates the pass. Any reform must be joint. Neither level of government can act alone.

Debt Bondage

Population A migrant workers are currently funnelled through FWCMS/Bestinet.

Bestinet, under FWCMS, receives RM537 million annually.

ILO Convention 97 requires equal treatment with nationals; ILO Convention 29 prohibits debt bondage and forced labour.

The current system – with documented debt bondage, fees extracted from workers before arrival, and lack of a signed contract – prima facie violates both conventions.

Twilight Zone

Population B, stateless residents in the twilight zone, fall into several categories:

IMM13 holders have visit pass under Regulation 11(2). It does not authorise employment (Immigration Circular IM.101/HQ‑G/429/1 Vol.4 2021). There are an estimated 100,000‑200,000 IMM13 holders in Sabah.

Kad Burung‑Burung and Census Certificate holders. These, having older documentation, are also stateless. Many are elderly. A deeming provision would ensure that they receive MyKAS or green MyKad (temporary residence).

Bajau Laut. The ESSCOM (Eastern Sabah Security Command) crnsus recorded about 29,000 Bajau Laut, including 6,000 citizens.

There’s biometric data on approximately 27,000 individuals.

Stateless children, born in Sabah, cannot obtain birth certificates without marriage certificates or police reports. They have no legal identity.

Track 1 . . .

Track 1 for Population A requires federal legislative action with Sabah’s consent.

Track 2 . . .

Track 2 applies for Population B. It isn’t about recruitment, it’s about regularising persons already present, many born in Sabah. — NMH

Related internal links . . .

The post New Labour Package For Sabah From Parliament . . . first appeared on NMH.

Commentary And Analysis . . . The media has reported that the government intends “cutting out agents” through a Government‑to‑Government (G2G) model involving employers’ associations, with no private agents for migrant worker recruitment. In Part 1, we saw that subject matter experts were in consensus that there can be no law against direct migrant worker employment by employers and workers.

That policy, if implemented, requires several legal changes.

Direct Migrant Worker

The Immigration Regulations 1963 must be amended for direct migrant worker recruitment, thereby allowing direct Calling Visa applications by employers, without routing through FWCMS.

The existing MoUs with source countries must be terminated or renegotiated; for example, the Malaysia–Indonesia Memorandum of Understanding that mandates the One Channel System would need replacement.

The FWCMS contract held by Bestinet must be terminated or expire – the contract currently runs runs 2028 or 2031; breaking it requires negotiation or compensation, which has fiscal implications.

The Private Employment Agencies Act 1981 does not mandate agents, but the administrative policies that treat agents as the sole channel must be rescinded.

Until these steps are completed, direct hiring for PLKS categories remains illegal. An employer who reads the consensus in the earlier part and acts on it immediately would be committing an offence under section 55B of the Immigration Act.

Consensus Correct

The consensus was correct as a matter of policy but incomplete as a matter of law.

If the government amends the regulations and allows association‑led recruitment, that model would be lawful.

However, the involvement of associations still requires a legal framework: does the employer contract directly with the worker?

Does the association perform the vetting and referral functions of the former agent?

Is the association licensed under any statute?

In Germany’s Triple Win project, a dedicated implementing agency (GIZ) coordinates the process.

Exemption

Malaysia would need issuing a specific exemption under the Private Employment Agencies Act or gazette a new regulation permitting association‑led recruitment.

There should be no law against direct employment by employers and workers.

However, under current Malaysian law – specifically Immigration Regulations 1963 Regulation 11, the mandatory FWCMS system operated by Bestinet, and existing bilateral MoUs with source countries – direct hiring of general foreign workers was effectively illegal and may result in criminal penalties under section 55B of the Immigration Act 1959/63.

Again, for direct hiring, the government must amend the Immigration Regulations, terminate or renegotiate the relevant MoUs, and replace the FWCMS monopoly with a G2G or association‑led system.

Foreign workers must not enter on tourist passes to seek employment; that remains an offence under section 39(b).

A lawful alternative was a G2G system where employers apply directly for Calling Visas, with vetting by employers’ associations and trade unions in both countries.

This model was permitted under ILO Convention 97 and the Trade Unions Act 1959, but would require new regulations for authorising association‑led recruitment without licensed private agents.

Questions

When analysing any consensus on migration or labour law, we must ask:

Does the consensus describe what those involved wishes the law to be, or what the law actually was?

Is there subsidiary legislation, administrative policy, or an international agreement operating beneath the primary statute?

Is source‑country law a limiting factor that cannot be waived by Malaysia alone?

By distinguishing between moral claims (what should be) and positive law (what is), the consensus will be both principled and useful for policymakers and practitioners.

Good law reform advocacy insists on accurate diagnosis before prescription.

The present foreign worker system was nothing but corruption. The workers lose out.

Others Benefit

The consensus was essentially correct as a description of how the system functions in practice.

However, for complete subject matter expert analysis, three important nuances must be added: who the “others” are, what the evidence shows, and how the system became this way.

The consensus was not hyperbole.

The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) found that the Home Ministry issued Bestinet a letter of acceptance before finalising procurement terms, forcing the government to negotiate a fee increase from RM100 to RM215 per worker – a 115 per cent hike.

Bestinet now receives RM537 million per year or RM3.2 billion over six years.

The system operated for six years without a signed contract.

Meanwhile, the Malaysian Anti‑Corruption Commission (MACC) exposed a “counter setting” scam where a senior Immigration officer controlled approximately 50 officers and agents, with corrupt officers grossing millions annually. MACC seized RM800,000 from just two junior immigration officers’ homes.

The consensus was correct but incomplete.

Others

Bestinet: Founded by a Bangladeshi national granted Malaysian permanent residency, who, according to Bloomberg, selected the 10 Bangladeshi agencies from over 1,000, while political handlers managed the politics.

Bangladeshi agents: At least one worker paid US$4,400; UN experts report fees exceeding official rates by over five times; workers pay up to RM25,000 through debt, often for jobs that do not exist.

Cartel partners: A UN experts report notes “a small number of recruitment agencies operate as a closed syndicate sustained by corruption”.

Rogue employers: Issued quotas for non‑existent jobs, leaving stranded workers “jobless, unpaid, homeless, and at constant risk of arrest”.

Documentation

How “workers lose out” was documented.

Over 100,646 PLKS holders in construction alone became “untraceable” after a legalisation programme.

Eight Bangladeshis were coerced into forced labour in Gua Musang for up to seven months.

One worker, Shofiqul Islam, borrowed $4,400 for a construction job, his employer vanished, and he later died in a derelict building outside Kuala Lumpur.

Global Slavery

The Global Slavery Index ranks Malaysia 12th highest in the Asia‑Pacific for modern slavery, with 6.3 affected per 1,000 people – up from 4.2 in 2016.

The US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report maintains Malaysia at Tier 2, acknowledging that root causes “such as exploitative recruitment systems, debt bondage, and weak monitoring” remain unaddressed.

The present foreign worker system was structured for extracting maximum value from workers through systemic corruption that enriches a cartel of politically connected vendors, recruitment agents, and complicit officials at every level – while workers enter deeper into debt bondage, face widespread exploitation, and have no meaningful recourse.

The UN experts summarise it well: “We are deeply troubled that fraudulent recruitment and the exploitation of migrants remain widespread and systematic in Malaysia.”

The National Action Plan on Forced Labour nears its end with limited progress; “by some measures, the problem has worsened”.

The consensus was not an exaggeration. It is a concise description of a system that has been formally documented as broken. — NMH

The post Direct Migrant Worker Recruitment: Malaysia Needs Specific Exemption Under Act first appeared on NMH.

Commentary And Analysis . . . Subject matter experts including the legal fraternity are in consensus that there can be no law in Malaysia against direct migrant worker employment by employers and workers.

Foreign workers can either come here and get a job or employers can visit worker‑surplus countries and hire workers directly.

Employers Associations, Workers Associations, and unions in both countries can be involved.

The philosophical foundation on the consensus, it can be conceded, was sound.

Under Article 6 of the Federal Constitution, there’s no slavery or forced labour, which implies that employers and workers should be free to contract.

The Contracts Act 1950 does not forbid direct hiring.

Direct Hiring

Direct hiring already exists legally for certain categories. MDEC, Petronas, and universities hire expatriates directly under the Expatriate Services Division (ESD) system without agents.

The Private Employment Agencies Act 1981 (Act 246) regulates agents; it does not mandate them. Direct hiring was not inherently illegal under law in Malaya.

The consensus was also correct that employers’ associations, workers’ associations, and unions can be involved.

Malaysia has ratified ILO Convention 97 on Migration for Employment, which encourages cooperation between employers’ and workers’ organisations in migration matters.

For example, the MTUC–KSBSI Memorandum of Understanding of 2019 already conducts pre‑departure briefings for Indonesian workers.

The Trade Unions Act 1959 and the Industrial Relations Act 1967 permit such involvement in recruitment and welfare matters.

The Germany–Indonesia Triple Win project – where German employers, Indonesian nursing unions, and GIZ cooperate without private agents – demonstrates that association‑led recruitment was both permissible and superior.

The consensus was not only legally permissible but represents best international practice.

Direct Migrant Worker Employment Wrong In Law

If the consensus had stopped at “There should be no law against direct employment”, it would have been a legitimate policy position. But it asserts that “there can be no law” – as a factual matter of existing legal reality.

That’s where it goes wrong.

First, there are laws that block direct hiring for general foreign workers.

Immigration Regulations 1963 Regulation 11 requires that employers apply for a Visa Dengan Rujukan (VDR) or Calling Visa through an approved source‑country system.

Since 2016, that system has been the Foreign Worker Centralised Management System (FWCMS), operated by the private vendor Bestinet.

No one cannot bypass FWCMS.

The 2018 Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Human Resources (KSM) for PLKS workers in manufacturing, construction, plantation, services, and agriculture requires that employers use licensed agents or FWCMS; direct applications are rejected.

Undocumented Workers

No plantation manager can visit Lombok and bring back workers directly tomorrow. The manager will be charged under section 55B of the Immigration Act 1959/63, which penalises the employment of undocumented workers.

A fine between RM10,000 and RM50,000 per illegal worker applies where proper procedures were not followed.

The consensus ignores existing subsidiary legislation and administrative policy backed by criminal sanctions.

Second, the consensus that “workers can come here and get a job” was illegal under current law.

Section 6(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1959/63 provides that no person shall enter Malaysia without a pass or visa stating the purpose of entry.

Social Visit Pass

Social visit pass holders cannot seek or accept employment.

Section 39(b) makes working on a social visit pass an offence punishable by a fine which can reach RM10,000 or imprisonment for 12 months, or both.

The system requires a valid job offer before entry, obtained through the Calling Visa process. That’s precisely why agents exist for creating the paper trail before arrival. The literal reading of the consensus would counsel a worker to commit a criminal offence.

Third, the consensus that “employers can visit worker‑surplus countries and hire workers directly” was blocked by source‑country law.

Indonesia’s Law No. 18 of 2017 on the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers, for example, expressly prohibits direct hiring of Indonesian workers by foreign employers without the involvement of licensed Indonesian placement agencies (PPTKIS).

The Philippines’ POEA rules similarly ban direct hiring.

Even if Malaysia amends all its laws tomorrow for direct hiring, Jakarta will stop the worker at the airport.

A Malaysian employer cannot override the sovereign law of another state.

The consensus treats Indonesia and Bangladesh as passive recipients of Malaysian policy, ignoring their own statutory frameworks and enforcement mechanisms.

The consensus implies that there’s a system which must be removed, but it does not explain why the system was put in place. Agent intermediation was mandated after the 1990s for several reasons.

Fraud

First, documentation fraud: before FWCMS, employers submitted fake demand letters.

Workers arrived, found no jobs, and became undocumented. Agents were mandated as gatekeepers for verifation of genuine demand and quota.

Second, debt bondage prevention: source‑country agencies cap recruitment fees.

This has failed in practice, but it was the stated purpose of mandating intermediation. Direct hiring can result in illegal salary deductions; the Employment Act 1955, section 24, limits deductions, but enforcement was weak.

Third, recalibration and amnesty control: the Home Ministry uses agents for tracking numbers and controlling the migrant population. In 2023, there were approximately 1.7 million active PLKS holders. The Ministry claims that without agents, runaway workers cannot be traced.

Fourth, foreign policy and rent‑seeking: MoUs on labour recruitment are tied with diplomatic and trade arrangements.

For example, the Bangladesh labour quota was linked with purchases of palm oil and rice.

Agents are often politically connected in both countries; removing them disrupts rent‑seeking networks that underpin bilateral economic relations.

Recruiting Agents

The 2021 Malaysia–Bangladesh Memorandum of Understanding on worker recruitment, effective for five years, specifically contemplates the role of recruiting agencies.

The 2022 Malaysia–Indonesia Memorandum of Understanding requires the use of the One Channel System, which mandates Indonesian and Malaysian recruitment agencies.

These are not merely administrative policies; they are international agreements given domestic effect under Malaysian law. The consensus therefore does not merely challenge a ministry guideline; it would require Malaysia breaching treaty obligations. — NMH

In Part 2, we look at whether the Immigration Regulations 1963 must be amended for direct migrant worker recruitment.

The post Direct Migrant Worker Recruitment Disallowed In Malaysia first appeared on NMH.

The decision in the 1MDB-Tanore case involving former prime minister Najib Razak was delivered in open court on 26 December 2025. More than three months on, the full written grounds of judgment have yet to be issued.

This is not, in itself, unprecedented. Delays in the preparation of written grounds have occurred in other complex and high-profile cases, particularly where the record is voluminous and the issues are intricate. But the present situation provides a timely case study — not of any individual judge, but of a broader procedural question.

What happens to the rights of an accused person when the reasoning of the court is not made available in time?

An Unusual Timeline

The 1MDB-Tanore decision was delivered on 26 December 2025, during what is typically a year-end holiday period.

Proceedings began in the morning and continued for much of the day, with the court reading extensively from prepared notes in delivering its decision, right until 8.30 that evening.

In the course of proceedings, Judge Datuk Collin Lawrence Sequerah also indicated — upon application by counsel for the accused — that the written grounds would be made available in due course, noting that the material would need to be compiled and arranged in a more methodical form.

These observations are not unusual in themselves. Judges often prepare detailed notes ahead of delivery, particularly in complex cases, and may subsequently refine and organise their written grounds.

However, they do underscore a central point: that substantive reasoning has already been articulated, even if the final written form remains pending.

The question, therefore, is not whether reasons exist — but when they will be made fully accessible.

The Eight-Week Expectation

In Malaysia, the preparation of written grounds of judgment is guided by long-standing judicial practice. Pekeliling Ketua Pendaftar Bil. 1/2002 sets an expectation that such grounds be prepared within eight weeks from the filing of a notice of appeal, with reasons to be recorded if that timeline is not met.

This expectation was reaffirmed in a 2025 communication from the Chief Judge of Malaya, underscoring the continued importance of timeliness within the system.

These are not rigid statutory deadlines. Judges must grapple with complex evidence, detailed submissions, and the need to produce decisions that can withstand appellate scrutiny. Time, in such cases, is not a luxury but a necessity.

Yet the existence of an established timeframe suggests that timeliness is not incidental — it is integral.

When Delay Meets the Right of Appeal

The issue, therefore, is not whether delay can occur, but when delay begins to carry consequences.

The right of appeal is a cornerstone of the criminal justice process. But it must be a meaningful right. Appeals are built on reasoning: on understanding how and why a decision was reached, what findings were made, and how the law was applied.

Without full written grounds, the defence is placed in a constrained position. Strategic decisions must be made without complete visibility. Grounds of appeal may be framed without the benefit of the court’s full reasoning.

In practical terms, the process risks becoming reactive rather than considered.

Lessons from Past Cases

Malaysian appellate courts have, on occasion, acknowledged the importance of timely and complete written grounds in facilitating effective appeals.

In Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor, issues relating to the timing and availability of written grounds were raised in the broader context of appellate preparation, highlighting the importance of full reasoning in enabling effective appeals.

Similarly, in Public Prosecutor v Mohd Radhi bin Yaakob, the courts underscored that appellate review depends fundamentally on the trial judge’s reasoning — reinforcing that written grounds are not a mere formality, but an essential component of justice.

These cases do not suggest that delay invalidates a decision. But they illustrate a consistent principle: appellate justice depends on timely and complete reasoning.

Beyond Administrative Delay

None of this suggests impropriety, nor does it diminish the complexity of cases before the courts.

But where established timelines are exceeded by a significant margin, the question shifts. It is no longer about administrative delay alone, but about its impact on the fairness of subsequent proceedings.

Justice is not only about outcomes, but about process. And process includes the timely articulation of reasons.

A judgment delivered without its full written grounds leaves a gap — one that the appellate process is expected to bridge. The longer that gap persists, the more difficult that task becomes.

The 1MDB-Tanore Delay: A Question Worth Asking

At what point, then, does delay cease to be a matter of practicality and begin to affect the fairness of the process itself?

Justice delayed in its reasoning may not overturn a decision — but it can shape the fairness of what comes next. – NMH

The post 1MDB-Tanore – Delay in Written Grounds Raises Questions of Fairness first appeared on NMH.

Many people have heard of the phrases “kangaroo court” and “hanging judge.”

However, experiencing or discussing these issues in Malaysia is a different matter entirely.

It’s so sensitive that you could even be charged with contempt of court for bringing it up.

This chilling reality is exemplified by two high-profile court cases involving former Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak.

The Missing Addendum

On 29 January 2024, Malaysia’s then King, Sultan Abdullah Ahmad Shah of Pahang, chaired the Pardons Board meeting where Najib’s 12-year prison sentence was halved, and his RM210 million fine was reduced to RM50 million.

Following this, Najib claimed there was a royal addendum allowing him to serve his sentence at home.

Initially, Najib contacted the Attorney-General’s chambers using various mediums about this matter through his defence team, but his claims were ignored.

Undeterred, he took the issue to court.

In July 2024, the Kuala Lumpur High Court dismissed Najib’s application, stating that his claims about the “addendum” were mere hearsay.

High Court Judge Datuk Amarjeet Singh ruled that the affidavits presented were inadmissible, as they were based on what others had “heard” rather than personal knowledge.

Specifically, he noted that statements from Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi and Pahang Menteri Besar Datuk Seri Wan Rosdy Wan Ismail relied on second-hand information from then-Minister Tengku Zafrul Tengku Abdul Aziz.

The judge concluded that there was no case warranting further investigation at that time.

However, in January 2025, the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court’s dismissal with a 2-1 majority ruling, stating that the hearsay argument “no longer stands” due to new evidence.

Another Kangaroo Court

In December 2025, a different High Court judge ruled that the order regarding the addendum was constitutionally invalid because it was never properly discussed or decided by the Pardons Board.

This ruling effectively dismissed Najib’s attempt to enforce the addendum for house arrest, although the debate over the addendum’s existence and validity is likely to continue in legal circles.

First, it was dismissed as hearsay, and then deemed invalid.

This is how the Malaysian courts handled a matter linked to a royal decree when Najib Razak was in the spotlight.

The situation raises serious questions about the integrity of the judiciary and the rule of law in Malaysia.

The Infamous 1MDB Decision: A Judicial Farce

Najib has been handed a staggering 15-year prison sentence and a jaw-dropping fine of RM11.38 billion.

This massive ruling stems from the misappropriation of RM2.3 billion from the beleaguered 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB).

The verdict, delivered by Federal Court Judge Datuk Collin Lawrence Sequerah, followed Najib’s conviction on four counts of abuse of power and 21 counts of money laundering.

Judge Sequerah firmly dismissed Najib’s claims that he had been misled by his subordinates or the elusive financier, Low Taek Jho, better known as Jho Low.

Jho Low faces charges in several countries over this scandal, where billions have been recovered and properties confiscated.

Yet, in all these countries, Najib was never named as a suspect in the 1MDB affair.

What Integrity?

This raises serious questions about the integrity of the judicial process in Malaysia.

Despite Jho Low still being at large, Judge Sequerah ruled that several “credible” witnesses were sufficient to convict Najib.

Ironically, almost all the witnesses put forward by the prosecution had questionable ties to Jho Low.

Take Jasmine Loo, for instance, who was on the run until she was arrested overseas and later deported back to Malaysia.

Her assets have been seized in multiple countries due to her links to 1MDB, yet she was deemed a “credible” witness in the Malaysian courts.

Then there’s Tan Sri Zeti Aziz, the former Bank Negara Governor, whose husband and son were ordered to pay millions by the Singapore government over 1MDB-related issues.

Despite being at the helm of Bank Negara during the scandal, she was also labelled a “credible” witness.

This is how the judicial system operates in Malaysia, especially in high-profile cases where many have become victims of a flawed system.

Another poignant example of this is our current Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim.

Anwar has faced imprisonment twice: first for abuse of power, then for sodomy.

The 10th Prime Minister has consistently maintained that he is a victim of Malaysia’s judiciary.

It would be enlightening to see Anwar pen a memoir detailing his experiences within this troubled legal landscape. – NMH

The post Kangaroo Court and Hanging Judges: A Disturbing Reality first appeared on NMH.

The Royal Addendum — a written instruction exercising the Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s constitutional power of mercy — has been rejected by the courts. Legally, the matter may be closed. Politically and constitutionally, however, the decision widens a dangerous precedent: it signals that even a royal instruction invoking mercy can be dismissed without meaningful engagement with the Rulers themselves.

A Royal Pardon, in this case brought out in the Royal Addendum issued by Malaysia’s 16th King, is not a declaration of innocence. It is not a technical loophole in the justice system. It is an act of mercy — a constitutional safeguard meant to humanise the law when strict procedure may satisfy legality but fail justice.

That is why this is far more than a case about one former prime minister.
It is about the Power of Mercy and the health of Malaysia’s constitutional monarchy.

Royal Addendum – When Mercy Becomes a Paper Tiger

In a constitutional monarchy, the Agong’s powers are not ceremonial. The prerogative of mercy exists as a moral counterbalance to the rigidity of law — a reminder that justice without humanity risks becoming cruelty.

Yet the King’s addendum was rejected largely on procedural grounds, without public engagement with the palace, without transparency on whether legal advice was sought by the Agong, and without reassurance that royal discretion was meaningfully weighed.

If mercy can be so easily constrained today, what happens tomorrow when a case involves another citizen, another monarch, or another constitutional test?

The silence of the Malay Rulers on this matter is deeply troubling. Silence risks normalising a future in which mercy exists only in theory — acknowledged in law, but sidelined in practice.

From Royal Instruction to Political Celebration

Then came the politics.

DAP’s Yeo Bee Yin posted: “Another reason to celebrate this year end.”

Separately, Raja Sara Petra Kamarudin summarised the outcome starkly:

The King’s addendum rejected.
House arrest denied.
Three years remain in Kajang.

Both statements are legally accurate. Only one is celebratory. And that distinction matters.

Yeo Bee Yin’s post caused more damage than the courts themselves — not because Najib Razak is innocent, but because it confirmed what many within UMNO have long suspected: this was never solely about law or justice. It was also about humiliation.

Justice demands restraint.
Mercy demands humility.
Celebration demands neither — and has no place when constitutional prerogatives are at stake.

UMNO’s Silence Is the Real Test Of The Addendum

This is where the focus shifts from Najib to UMNO.

UMNO sits in government. UMNO provides parliamentary stability. UMNO bears the political and emotional cost of a unity government — repeatedly.

Yet when a senior figure from within the same government publicly celebrates Najib’s continued incarceration, UMNO is cornered.

This is no longer just a legal or moral matter.
It is a political insult.

Will UMNO remain silent yet again?
Will it issue another carefully worded statement about “respecting the courts” while its dignity is publicly eroded?

Every time Najib is mocked by political allies, it is not Najib alone who is diminished. It is UMNO’s bargaining power, its relevance, and its standing within the coalition.

A unity government cannot survive on asymmetry — where one partner absorbs the blows while another pops the champagne.

Also read: BLACK DAY FOR JUSTICE FOR MALAYSIA AS NAJIB BEGINS SENTENCE

The Precedent That Remains

Najib Razak will continue serving his sentence.
The courts have spoken.

But the precedent remains.

A royal instruction invoking mercy can be dismissed without the Rulers’ voice.
Political allies can celebrate a partner’s humiliation without consequence.
And the constitutional meaning of the Royal Pardon can be quietly narrowed.

The King’s addendum may be rejected.
But the erosion of mercy has been recorded.

Now we wait — not for the courts, but for the Rulers to reflect, and for UMNO to decide whether it still understands the power it claims to defend.

Because when mercy is weakened, justice itself becomes smaller. – NMH

The post Royal Addendum: When The Power Of Mercy Is Being Quietly Eroded first appeared on NMH.

Shafee: Liberty Cannot Be Suspended

KUALA LUMPUR – Tan Sri Shafee Abdullah’s statement today, issued in reaction to the press release by the Prime Minister’s Office and the Attorney-General Chambers, is more than a defence of his client, former Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak. It is a reminder that Malaysia’s justice system must remain vigilant against executive overreach. His words underscore the principle that liberty, once granted by the constitution, cannot be suspended at the convenience of the government.

Shafee’s insistence that a house arrest order — if granted — must be enforced immediately is not simply a procedural point. It is a constitutional one. To delay such an order would be to dilute the very meaning of liberty, reducing fundamental rights to administrative discretion.

Evidence and Fair Trial

Equally significant are Shafee’s concerns about access to evidence. He has pointed out that crucial documents and testimonies, including those linked to Goldman Sachs and Tim Leissner, remain out of reach for Najib’s defence team. If exculpatory material is withheld, the fairness of the trial itself comes into question.

This is not a matter of sympathy for a single defendant. It is about whether Malaysia’s courts can uphold the principle that justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done.

Executive Commentary and Public Confidence

The government’s press statement may have been intended to reassure the public, but Shafee’s response highlights a deeper issue: the risk of executive commentary shaping perceptions of ongoing judicial proceedings. When official pronouncements appear to pre-empt or condition court decisions, they erode confidence in the independence of the judiciary.

Why It Matters

Malaysia’s judiciary now faces a defining test. Will it enforce constitutional rights without compromise, or will political calculation seep into the administration of justice? Shafee’s statement ensures that this question cannot be ignored.

This case is not just about Najib Razak. It is about the credibility of Malaysia’s institutions, the separation of powers, and the assurance that constitutional guarantees are more than words on paper.

Crucial Week Ahead for Najib

Next week will mark a decisive moment for Datuk Seri Najib Razak. On 22 December, the High Court is scheduled to deliver its ruling on the Addendum application, which could determine whether Najib is entitled to serve the remainder of his sentence under house arrest. Just days later, on 26 December, Justice Collin Lawrence Sequerah will pronounce judgment in the long‑running 1MDB–Tanore trial, a case that has been central to Malaysia’s most high‑profile financial scandal. Together, these back‑to‑back decisions will shape not only Najib’s immediate future but also the wider narrative of judicial independence and accountability in Malaysia.

Closing Thoughts

Beyond Malaysia’s borders, the implications of these two cases are closely watched. Judicial independence is not only a domestic concern but also a marker of credibility in the eyes of investors, international partners, and global institutions. When constitutional rights are seen to be compromised or subject to political influence, confidence in Malaysia’s governance and economic stability can be shaken. Shafee’s statement, therefore, is more than a legal defence — it is a reminder that the integrity of the justice system is inseparable from the nation’s reputation on the world stage. – NMH

The post Shafee: Authorities’ Statement Raises Concerns About Judicial Independence first appeared on NMH.

The issue of whether former Prime Minister Najib Razak will be allowed to serve the remainder of his prison sentence at home has reignited a national debate about the role of the monarchy in Malaysia’s justice system.

The Royal Addendum issued by the Pahang Sultan Al-Sultan Abdullah Ri’ayatuddin Al-Mustafa Billah Shah when he was Malaysia’s 16th King in 2024, granting Najib the privilege to serve his sentence under house arrest, has been mired in legal and political challenges, with certain parties within the government seemingly ignoring or undermining the King’s decree. But does the government have the authority to disregard this decision? And more crucially, is the King’s word now being sidelined?

In a landmark move, the previous Yang di-Pertuan Agong issued an Addendum to the Royal Decree that would have allowed Najib to serve the rest of his sentence under house detention instead of in prison. The letter containing this decree was forwarded to the then Attorney-General (AG), Tan Sri Ahmad Terrirudin Mohd Salleh, but it was never acted upon. Instead, the document was sent to the current King for review, despite being an explicit directive from the previous monarch.

The failure of the AG and the government to execute the Royal Order raises fundamental questions: why was it ignored, and whose interests are being served by this inaction?

This even brought Najib to lodge a police report over the former AG’s alleged criminal misconduct of which the case has been brought to court and will be heard on 19 August this year.

Najib Razak’s Legal Stand

Frustrated by the lack of action, Najib took matters into his own hands. He wrote to the government and various relevant bodies demanding answers regarding the non-execution of the Addendum. Najib has cited Article 42 of the Federal Constitution, which guarantees the rights of citizens, including those who have been incarcerated, to be treated fairly and to have their rights upheld. He has argued that by withholding the Addendum, the government is depriving him of his legitimate entitlement as a citizen of Malaysia, a right granted to him by the monarch.

The Government’s Response, Or Lack Of

The current Attorney-General, Tan Sri Mohd Dusuki Mokhtar, in an attempt to defend the government’s stance, recently made an appeal to the Court of Appeal ruling. The AG argued that Najib did not act with due diligence in obtaining the Addendum letter, which was only presented by Najib’s son, Datuk Mohd Nizar, via an affidavit a day before the Appeal court hearing. This argument hinges on the assertion that it was Najib’s responsibility to ensure that the letter was in his possession.

However, the core of the issue is that the duty to deliver such a decree falls squarely on the government. It is not the responsibility of the individual or their family members to chase down royal decrees or exercise their rights in the absence of government action.

Tan Sri Shafee’s Stand

Tan Sri Muhammad Shafee Abdullah, counsel for Najib Razak, has been presenting compelling arguments at the Federal Court, shedding light on critical aspects of the case. One key point raised by Shafee relates to the Addendum, which pertains to the Royal Decree that would allow Najib to serve the remainder of his sentence under house detention. In response to the AG’s contention, Shafee explained that the language used in the two documents — the Pardon that specifies the reduction of sentence and fine, and the house detention order — differs because they were drafted by two different officers. In fact, Shafee pointed out that the language in the Addendum was “more regal” than the document containing the Pardon.

Shafee also highlighted a significant issue regarding communication between Najib’s legal team and the relevant authorities. He cited that all attempts to request clarification about the Addendum were met with silence, despite multiple letters sent to the relevant parties. This lack of response contrasts with the AG’s argument that Datuk Nizar, Najib’s son, should have presented the affidavit containing the letter from the Istana earlier. The AG claimed that, despite being incarcerated, Najib had access to all facilities and could have arranged for the documents to be acquired sooner. Moreover, the AG pointed out that Nizar, being a member of the Pahang Exco, could have approached the Istana directly for consultation on the matter.

This of course brought sighs of consternation from those in the courtroom as most Malaysians are aware, there is an art and certain protocols to observe when dealing with the Palace. Like this writer stated in my FB post: “We are talking about the Istana here. We must wait for them to call us. That is why we use the term ‘mencemar duli’.” This remark alludes to the established protocol when dealing with the royal palace, emphasizing the necessity of waiting for an invitation from the Istana. The term “mencemar duli” refers to the traditional practice of showing proper respect to the royal family by not making any unsolicited approach to the Istana, highlighting the need for formal invitation or engagement.

This key point of the legal argument underscores the delicate and formal nature of dealing with the monarchy, reminding both the court and the public of the protocols that govern such interactions. It is clear from Shafee’s statement and the surrounding context that the AG’s assumption that Najib and his team should have acted outside these formal protocols fails to acknowledge the unique and regulated relationship between the government and the Istana.

The Monarchy and the Rule of Law

The heart of this controversy lies in the very foundation of Malaysia’s Constitution: the role of the King. As the custodian of the nation’s sovereignty, the King holds the exclusive right to issue pardons, reprieves, and other forms of mercy. To challenge or disregard this prerogative undermines the very institution of the monarchy and raises serious concerns about the erosion of the rule of law.

It is essential to remind the Malaysian public that the monarch’s authority is enshrined in Article 42 of the Federal Constitution, which grants the King the power to pardon, to commute sentences, and to take other actions as deemed necessary. The refusal to execute the Royal Addendum directly challenges this constitutional right and places the monarchy in a precarious position.

Call to the Rulers

With the upcoming Conference of Rulers meeting, expected to be held on 16 and 17 July 2025, there is a growing call for the rulers to weigh in on this issue. It is a critical moment for the monarchy to assert its authority and ensure that the rule of law is upheld. If certain government officials continue to flout the Royal Decree, it raises a serious question: Is the King’s word now no longer valid? Should the Rulers, as the highest authority in Malaysia, intervene to protect the integrity of the monarchy?

Ignoring a Royal Decree is not just a matter of legal negligence; it could very well be seen as an affront to the very fabric of Malaysia’s constitutional monarchy. The implications of such actions go beyond Najib’s case—they represent a potential crack in the foundation of the monarchy’s role in the nation.

In conclusion, as the legal battle over Najib Razak’s sentence continues, the wider issue of respecting the monarchy’s authority comes into sharper focus. The Malaysian government must decide whether it will continue to ignore the wishes of the monarchy or whether it will uphold the decrees issued by the King. The upcoming Conference of Rulers presents an opportunity for the monarchy to make its stance clear, ensuring that royal decrees are respected and that the King’s authority remains intact in the eyes of the people. – NMH

The post House Detention For Najib: A Constitutional Dilemma first appeared on NMH.

Terrorism is a crime of the most heinous nature, often equated with war crimes or crimes against humanity due to its devastating impact on society. While a universal definition of terrorism remains elusive, the United Nations provides a widely accepted interpretation, defining it as:

“Any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”

This definition underscores the deliberate targeting of civilians and the use of violence as a tool to instil fear, achieve political objectives, or exert coercion, marking terrorism as a profound violation of human rights and international norms.

This definition also does not reference any specific religion, class, or creed. This omission reflects the principle that terrorism and criminality are not tied to any particular faith, ideology, or demographic. However, there is a widespread perception that the fear of terrorism is synonymous with a fear of those practicing Islam or adhering to other religions. The stereotype that “all terrorists are Muslim,” or worse, that “all Muslims are terrorists,” is not only factually incorrect but also inherently racist.

Conflating Terrorism With Islam On A Global Scale

Some commentators perpetuate this misconception by demonising Muslims and claiming that Islam is incompatible with Western democratic values. This conflation of terrorism with Islam fosters intolerance, discrimination, and prejudice against Muslims on a global scale. Alarmingly, such views have taken root not only in the West but also among individuals from non-Western backgrounds, including academics, activists, and religious leaders.

The conflation of terrorism with Islam fosters intolerance, discrimination, and prejudice against Muslims on a global scale

It is crucial to recognize that acts of terrorism have been committed by individuals from diverse faiths and backgrounds, often driven by motives such as revenge, retaliation, or the promotion of specific ideologies. Broadly attributing terrorism to a single religion is not only unjust but also counterproductive in fostering mutual understanding and combating terrorism effectively.

Religion is often defined as a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature, and purpose of the universe, typically involving devotional practices, rituals, and a moral code that governs human behaviour. Terrorism, on the other hand, is an action or threat aimed at influencing governments or intimidating the public to advance political, religious, or ideological agendas.

While religion is generally seen as a guiding framework to embrace a particular set of beliefs, in Malaysia, religions are largely practiced in ways that emphasize peace, tolerance, and harmony. Acts of violence, including terrorism, extremism, hate, and discrimination, are considered fundamentally incompatible with the tenets of religious practices in Malaysia and the principles enshrined in the Federal Constitution. As such, terrorism is viewed as a grave offence under Malaysian law.

Serious Crimes

Under Section 130 (Part VIa) of the Penal Code, acts of terrorism are classified as serious crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the High Courts of Malaya (Malaysia). Specifically, Section 130C(1) of the Penal Code prescribes severe penalties: individuals who commit terrorist acts that result in death may face the death penalty, while other terrorist acts are punishable with imprisonment for a term ranging from seven to thirty years, along with the possibility of a fine.

This legal framework reflects Malaysia’s commitment to maintaining peace and addressing acts of terrorism with utmost seriousness. Within the scope of Section 130 of the Penal Code, certain offences may be construed as crimes of strict liability, although the interpretation of strict liability depends on judicial precedents. For instance, under Section 130JB(1), a person found in possession, custody, or control of any item associated with a terrorist group or the commission of a terrorist act—whether through providing, displaying, distributing, or selling such items—faces penalties including imprisonment for up to seven years, a fine, and the forfeiture of the items in question.

This stringent prohibition underscores the gravity of terrorism-related crimes, such as acting as money carriers (mules), financing terrorism, promoting terrorist groups or their ideologies, or possessing terrorism-related materials. These offences are considered highly detrimental to public safety and security, emphasizing the seriousness with which they are addressed under Malaysian law. Thus, terrorism and related offences are classified as crimes of the highest order, adjudicated by the criminal High Courts rather than the Shariah Courts, as they are not considered to be religious crimes.

Factually & Historically Inaccurate

While deviations from Islamic faith practices may fall within the jurisdiction of Syariah Courts, such deviations do not equate to acts of terrorism. Any conflation of religion, particularly Islam, with terrorism is both factually and historically inaccurate. Terrorism transcends boundaries of colour, race, gender, religion, and creed, manifesting as acts of indiscriminate and incomprehensible violence. Recognizing this distinction is essential to preventing the spread of prejudice and ensuring that terrorism is addressed as a universal threat to peace and humanity.

Given the clear jurisdiction of terrorism offences under the Malaysian criminal courts, it is crucial that rehabilitation and deradicalisation programs address the behaviour and criminal acts of perpetrators rather than focusing solely on their ideologies.

The Federal Constitution guarantees the freedom of belief, and being labelled a radical does not inherently constitute a crime, nor does holding radical beliefs necessarily result in criminal behaviour. Furthermore, there is no precise legal definition of “radicalism,” in the Malaysian law as it remains a subjective and personal label. Assuming that correcting an individual’s ideology is the sole method of rehabilitation perpetuates the misconception that Islam equates to terrorism and vice versa. This notion is as flawed as suggesting that prisoners or criminals inherently lack proper ideology or faith, ignoring the reality that even devout individuals have committed crimes. While theological perspectives can address misconceptions about religion, the inclination to commit crime and violence requires specialized treatment by professionals such as criminologists, sociologists, psychologists, therapists, and counsellors within structured rehabilitation and deradicalisation programs.

To move forward, it is essential to end the conflation of terrorism or violence with religion. Programs aimed at rehabilitating individuals involved in terrorism should be tailored to address their criminal behaviour and psychological tendencies, ensuring they no longer pose a threat to society. Ultimately, terrorism must be viewed and treated as an act of crime and not dependent on religion or ideology per se because it is, and will always remain, a criminal act. – NMH

Also read:

What I think of Zakir Naik

 2024: End Of A Crappy Trilogy

The post Terrorism Should Not Be Conflated With Religion first appeared on NMH.