Commentary And Analysis . . . Indeed, it has been alleged that Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, after becoming Deputy President of Umno in 1993, Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi — then Umno Youth chief— for launching blistering attacks on Mahathir, whom he (Anwar) wanted removed. Mahathir, based on loyalty, had been Prime Minister since 1981.

The incumbent Deputy President, Tun Ghaffar Baba, withdrew, Mahathir having probably remained neutral. What followed was a matter of historical record [res gestae].

Sodomy I happened.

The government, based on Anwar’s own words during fiery briefing in 1998 before the media, was depicted as being composed of “spineless creatures.”

Loyalty

Apparently, based on loyalty not being shown, Mahathir advised the police that the report lodged by Anwar’s secretary against a political writer should no longer be kept in view or marked for no further action. The writer listed, in a book, 50 reasons why Anwar should not be Prime Minister.

Betrayal

Anwar’s betrayal could not be forgotten, and was probably never forgiven.

Again, Sodomy I happened.

There was also Sodomy II.

It has been alleged that Mahathir prevailed upon Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak — read Sodomy 2 — for keeping Anwar out of the way. Najib was loyal.

House Arrest

Najib’s house arrest, decreed by the Agong on 29 January 2024, did not happen.

Najib was denied the house arrest. The responsibility lies with Anwar alone.

Of course, by his own admission, Najib did not declare the RM42m in political donation from SRC International, nor other political donation.

The court, taking the line of least resistance, jailed Najib on 23 August 2022, even though he was unrepresented.

Therein the matter stands.

Najib further faces the prospect of additional imprisonment—fifteen years, running concurrently, on 25 charges dubbed 1MDB —after completing jail for the SRC case.

Najib, having been denied remission on the halving of his sentence mentioned in the Pardons Board letter dated 29 January 2024, remains incarcerated.

There was light at the end of the tunnel when Najib obtained stay of execution on the RM1.8b claimed by SRC International.

Habeas Corpus

Habeas corpus arises as one form of remedy.

The Najib family could have filed habeas corpus application on the halving and the discharge and acquittal granted by Federal Court Review Panel Head, Judge Tan Sri Abdul Rahman, on the SRC case.

Neither step was taken.

Alternatively, Najib could have filed an application for judicial review on the remission after halving.

That too did not occur.

Instead, he filed judicial review on house arrest, which he recently withdrew, the matter having been rendered redundant when he was not released on 23 August 2024, based on remission.

There should be focus on securing fugitive Jho Low’s presence through extradition or mutual legal assistance, and on ensuring that any US clemency was conditioned on cooperation that remedies the procedural deficit, not merely on money returned.

All these place the issues in perspective for the commentary and analysis that follow.

Jurisprudential Replique

II. Jurisprudential Reply – Bar Council’s Challenge on the Zahid DNAA.

A. Introduction: Framing a Constitutional Controversy.

GRKumar’s “The Perilous Precipice” defends the Attorney General’s power under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution for discontinuing prosecutions [nolle prosequi].

It characterises the Malaysian Bar Council’s application for judicial review of the discharge not amounting to an acquittal, as an institutional encroachment, a trespass by professional body with alleged bias [parti pris] upon executive terrain.

We can test that thesis by doctrine alone [ratio decidendi].

We take no position on political wisdom or personal culpability.

The sole question was whether the article’s reasoning survives scrutiny under Malaysian public law [jus publicum].

It does not.

Category Errors

The thesis rests on category errors, misreadings of precedent, and an inversion of the burden of proof [onus probandi] in judicial review.

Most acutely, it asks that the court ignore the Attorney General’s motives while inviting the imputation of motives to the challenger, a contradiction in terms [contradictio in adjecto] fatal in any constitutional review.

B. The Nature of Article 145(3): Executive Power, Not Quasi‑Judicial Office.

The article begins by calling the Attorney General’s power a “quasi‑judicial authority” and a “cornerstone of the separation of powers.”

The labels misstate the law.

Character of the Power.

The Federal Court in Public Prosecutor v Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim held that Article 145(3) confers an executive power, not a quasi‑judicial function.

The distinction was not merely academic.

A quasi‑judicial power implies duty on hearing the other side [audi alteram partem] and giving reasons [ratio decidendi].

Executive power, by contrast, was reviewable only for illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety.

The Wednesbury standard, adopted in Rama Chandran v Industrial Court and applied in prosecutorial discretion in Repco Holdings Bhd v Public Prosecutor, governs review.

The article’s mischaracterisation inflates the shield around the Attorney General and narrows the court’s supervisory role beyond what precedent permits.

Separation Of Powers

The article treats the separation of powers as a wall against review.

In truth, the separation was the very reason for judicial review.

As the Federal Court affirmed in Pengarah Tanah dan Galian, Wilayah Persekutuan v Sri Lempah Enterprise Sdn Bhd, the courts are the final arbiters of legality [ultima ratio legis].

When the Bar invokes the supervisory jurisdiction, it does not usurp executive power; it merely requests that the judiciary test whether that power was lawfully exercised.

The Bar initiates, the court decides.

This is the architecture of Article 121(1) of the Federal Constitution, not its breach.

Part 2 will treat Locus Standi, Motive, and the Burden of Proof [Onus Probandi] in greater depth. — NMH

The post Loyalty And Trust Permeate The Zahid-Anwar Relationship first appeared on NMH.

According to the U.S. Justice Department website, fugitive financier Jho Taek Low (Jho Low) has filed a request for a presidential pardon from Donald Trump.

While Jho Low is still at large, former Prime Minister Najib Razak is in Kajang Prison. That contrast alone tells you everything wrong with how the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) case has played out.

Jho Low is the man U.S. prosecutors call the architect of the $4.5 billion fraud that looted 1MDB. He was charged in 2018, fled, and has remained beyond the reach of Malaysian and U.S. law enforcement ever since.

Najib, by contrast, was tried, convicted, and is now serving time for corruption, money laundering and abuse of power tied to the same scandal.

Here is the problem: you cannot have a fair trial against the alleged beneficiary without the alleged mastermind in the room.

Jho Low This, Jho Low That, But Where Is He?

Throughout Najib’s trial in Malaysia, the prosecution’s narrative placed Jho Low at the centre of every transaction.

Tim Leissner, the former Goldman Sachs banker who pleaded guilty in the U.S., testified that Jho Low ran the scheme and invoked Najib’s authority to move the money.

Yet Jho Low never took the stand.

Malaysia maintains a Red Notice for Jho Low is active, but he is not listed publicly and remains at large.”

Najib was left to defend himself against accusations built around a man he could not cross-examine.

That matters. In any adversarial system, the right to confront your accuser and test the evidence is not a technicality. It is the mechanism that separates a conviction from a railroading.

When the central witness is absent, the court is forced to rely on second-hand accounts, emails and inferences about intent. That’s why there were boxes and boxes among the Prosecutors’ files with the title “Hearsay”.

Malaysian courts ultimately found that sufficient, but “sufficient” is not the same as “fair” when the person who could confirm or refute the entire chain of events remains beyond jurisdiction.

What Sentence?

The irony in Jho Low’s application is stark. He has filed for a “Pardon after Completion of Sentence” despite never having faced a sentence.

The DOJ lists the request as pending with no further details.

If granted, the pardon would extinguish U.S. charges and remove any legal incentive for him to ever return and testify.

It would permanently freeze the record in amber, with Najib convicted and Jho Low free.

That is not justice. It is closure by attrition.

A pardon in this case does not merely forgive Jho Low but validates the idea that fleeing jurisdiction and waiting out the news cycle is a viable legal strategy for the wealthy and connected.

Precedents

It tells every future white-collar fugitive that if you hold out long enough, you can negotiate your way out while your co-defendants take the fall.

Supporters will argue it is about Jho Low offering to return hundreds of millions if charges are dropped, but transactional clemency makes sense only when the trade actually serves justice.

Returning money does not restore the process that was denied to Najib, nor does it restore public confidence that the law applies equally.

If the U.S. is serious about the rule of law, it should deny the pardon and cooperate with Malaysia to bring Jho Low back.

The 1MDB saga will not be resolved by forgiving the man everyone agrees ran it.

It will only be resolved when he faces a courtroom and answers the questions Najib was never allowed to ask.

Until then, what we have is not a concluded case. It is a half-tried one, and a pardon would make sure it stays that way. – NMH

The writer is the Vice-president of Parti Cinta Malaysia and a commentator on governance and public policy. The views expressed are his own.

Related articles:

Seven Years After Najib: The Lessons We Haven’t Learned

Black Day For Justice In Malaysia As Najib Begins Sentence

Jho Low Threatened Jasmine Loo Not To Return to Malaysia

The post A Jho Low Pardon Would Make A Mockery of Due Process in 1MDB Case first appeared on NMH.

On 9 May 2018, Malaysians ended Barisan Nasional’s (BN) 61-year rule and gave the mandate to Pakatan Harapan (PH). Eight years later today, things have spiralled down to almost a joke.

The PH campaign then was dominated by 1MDB, GST, and broader governance concerns under Datuk Seri Najib Razak’s administration.

Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad returned as prime minister at 93. It was a watershed for Malaysian democracy.

Eight years on, it is necessary to assess what changed, what remained, and whether the system itself has shifted.

This is not an audit of one man, but of the structures he worked within and the ones we still inhabit.

From One Administration to Four Premierships

On 9 May 2018, Najib Razak concluded his tenure as Malaysia’s sixth prime minister after nine years and 37 days in office.

Since then, Malaysia has had four prime ministers: Mahathir, Muhyiddin Yassin, Ismail Sabri Yaakob, and Anwar Ibrahim, alongside interim and caretaker periods.

The average tenure now stands at 1.8 years.

We once criticised the BN era for excessive stability. We have since corrected for that, perhaps too enthusiastically.

The Unity Government – Eight Years Later

The current unity government comprises PH, BN, GPS, GRS and Warisan.

In a twist few predicted in 2018, BN — the coalition voted out for its perceived failings — is back in Cabinet.

If GE14 proved that governments can be changed, the last eight years proved that the political elite are remarkably recyclable.

Corruption: From Headline Scandal to Incremental Gains

GE14 was, in many ways, a referendum on 1MDB.

The case eroded public trust and became shorthand for systemic abuse.

Eight years later, Malaysia’s score on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index stands at 52 out of 100 in 2025, placing 54th of 182 countries.

That is five points higher than the 47 recorded in 2018, when Malaysia ranked 61st.

The government has set a target of breaking into the top 25 by 2033, and the MACC aims for a score of 60 within two to three years.

Legislative progress includes the Finance and Fiscal Responsibility Act 2023, amendments to the Audit Act 1957, and beneficial ownership provisions under the Companies Act 2024.

Najib’s conviction was historic. It demonstrated that the rule of law could reach the highest office.

Yet the CPI score of 52 suggests that while impunity has been challenged, institutional reform remains incomplete.

We have moved from one dominant scandal to a landscape where “court clusters” cut across party lines.

The script has changed; the genre is familiar.

The Economy: From GST to SST, BR1M to STR, but the Bills Remain

The Najib administration’s signature fiscal policy was the Goods and Services Tax (GST), introduced in 2015 at 6%. It was deeply unpopular and became a central GE14 issue.

PH abolished GST in 2018 and reinstated the Sales and Service Tax (SST).

The GST vs SST debate has been reduced to politics. GST is often called regressive, yet most advanced economies offset this through targeted relief. SST, by contrast, collects less and lacks transparency—shrinking the very resources needed to support lower-income groups.

Either way, revenue constraints persist.

Cash aid has evolved from BR1M, which disbursed up to RM1,200 per household, to a suite of targeted programmes — STR, SARA, e-Madani — with digital delivery and means-testing.

The shift from blanket to targeted assistance is fiscally prudent.

The lived reality for many is that targeting is still imperfect, and the cost of living keeps rising.

Headline inflation was 1.7% in March 2026, with food inflation at 1.1%.

But eating out rose 2.3% — a reminder that real-world costs are climbing faster than the numbers suggest. Meanwhile, diesel in Peninsular Malaysia hit RM4.12 per litre in March 2026.

The ringgit strengthened to RM3.968 against the US dollar in January 2026, a level last seen in 2018.

Foreign direct investment is robust: RM282.2 billion in realised manufacturing FDI was recorded between 2022 and September 2025, with the total FDI position exceeding RM1 trillion by Q4 2025.

Still, median monthly household income was RM6,338 in 2024, and 1.2 million Malaysians were registered below the poverty line as of 31 December 2025.

The Poverty Line Income (PLI) was revised to RM2,705 in 2024. In 2016, median household income was RM5,228, and the PLI was RM980.

The numbers are not directly comparable due to methodology changes, but the sentiment on the ground is clear: nominal gains have been eaten by costs.

We replaced “cash is king” with “scan the QR code”, but for many, the wallet is still light.

Reform: The Manifesto Versus the Memo

The 2018 PH manifesto was comprehensive: abolish tolls, PTPTN, SOSMA, the Sedition Act, and enact a Political Financing Act.

Eight years later, tolls remain. PTPTN remains. SOSMA and the Sedition Act remain. The Political Financing Act is still being “studied”.

We have become adept at producing frameworks, blueprints, and task forces.

The gap between announcement and implementation is where “New Malaysia” lives.

To Najib’s credit, his administration delivered MRT Line 1, the Pan-Borneo Highway, and laid groundwork for the digital economy.

The issue in 2018 was not that nothing was built, but that trust was broken.

GE14 fixed the trust deficit temporarily. The last eight years show that rebuilding institutions takes longer than rebuilding highways.

Conclusion: The System Audit

GE14 proved that elections can remove a government. It did not, by itself, remove patronage, short-termism, or the circulation of elites.

BN is back in government. GLCs continue to dominate the economy. The civil service, procurement norms, and race-based mobilisation remain largely intact.

The Najib years delivered infrastructure and growth, but were undone by a catastrophic breach of governance.

The post-2018 years delivered accountability and genuine political competition, but have yet to deliver stability or decisive structural reform.

We saved Malaysia from one administration in 2018. The unresolved question in 2026 is whether we have built an administration that can save Malaysians from the next crisis — be it fiscal, institutional, or political.

Until then, “New Malaysia” remains a project, not a product. And the warranty is still under review. – NMH

The writer is the Vice-President of Parti Cinta Malaysia who still keeps his GE14 inky-finger selfie as a reminder that democracy is a process, not a purchase.

Editor’s note: New Malaysia Herald was born eight years ago. Thus the name …

Related articles:

Seven Years After Najib: The Lessons We Haven’t Learned

Here are the front pages of our local newspapers, the morning after GE14

The post Eight Years After We ‘Saved Malaysia’: Same Circus, New Tent first appeared on NMH.

With less than a week until his retirement, Tan Sri Azam Baki, the Chief Commissioner of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC), has revealed that two individuals are likely to be charged in connection with the RM1.1 billion Arm Holdings deal.

Although Azam kept their names under wraps, speculation has erupted around former economy minister Datuk Seri Rafizi Ramli and his ex-aide, James Chai.

This revelation has ignited intense political chatter across the nation.

The backdrop to this controversy is significant.

In recent months, Azam and Rafizi have been locked in a public spat.

New MACC Leadership

Rafizi has openly challenged Azam’s continued leadership of the MACC, arguing that to rebuild public trust, new leadership is essential.

Azam even acknowledged criticism later in 2023, noting that Rafizi was among those against renewing his contract.

Further fueling the political fire, earlier this year, an international media report sparked serious allegations against Azam.

This prompted the #TangkapAzamBaki movement, increasing calls for his resignation and placing the government under pressure to find a successor.

Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim initially stood by Azam, urging caution against hasty judgement.

However, public pressure mounted, leading to Azam’s pending replacement just before a planned rally demanding his ousting.

Alarm Bells

Now, with days left in his tenure, Azam’s announcement of potential charges against one of his fiercest critics raises alarm bells.

While this situation does not imply that investigations should be halted, it does bring to light essential concerns about timing and intent.

If wrongdoing is discovered in the Arm Holdings transaction, those responsible must face the full force of the law.

No politician, former minister, or public official should be above accountability.

Public Trust

However, justice isn’t only about what happens; it also relies on public trust in the fairness and integrity of the process.

This trust erodes when significant prosecutions coincide with politically charged transitions, especially involving individuals with a history of conflict.

The MACC’s legitimacy stems not just from its legal authority but from the belief of the public that this authority is exercised impartially and for the right reasons.

This distinction is crucial.

Anti-corruption bodies wield substantial powers: they can investigate, compel testimony, and recommend prosecution.

Personal Vendetta

These powers earn public respect only when there is confidence that they are applied in the name of justice, not personal vendettas or political agendas.

Once that perception is compromised, the institution itself begins to suffer.

Anwar rose to power on the language of institutional reforms and to combat corruption.

Malaysians were promised stronger institutions, greater accountability and a break from the political culture that blurred the line between governance and personal power.

Yet episodes like this risk reinforcing the very cynicism that reformasi was supposed to overcome.

A government genuinely committed to institutional reform must understand that credibility cannot depend solely on legal technicalities or procedural correctness.

Public trust also depends on judgment, timing and transparency.

That is why the incoming MACC leadership must approach this case carefully.

The issue now extends beyond the Arm Holdings investigation itself.

MACC Independent?

What is equally at stake is whether Malaysians can trust that anti-corruption enforcement is being carried out independently, professionally and free from political baggage.

If the evidence is strong, let the process proceed transparently and fairly.

If prosecutorial decisions appear entangled with personal feuds, political grievances or last-minute score-settling, then the damage to institutional credibility may outlast any individual case.

Once the public begins to see anti-corruption enforcement as selective or retaliatory, restoring confidence becomes far more difficult than losing it in the first place. – NMH

The writer is the Vice-president of Parti Cinta Malaysia and a commentator on governance and public policy. The views expressed are his own.

The post Is MACC Enforcement Impartial? Azam Baki’s Timing Raises Doubts first appeared on NMH.

Commentary And Analysis . . . Sabah needs new labour package, in October 2026, tabled in Parliament. It can be law by Q3 2027, with the pilot running from January 2028.

The distance between the new labour package and existing law was no longer conceptual. It takes perhaps 40 pages of drafting by the Attorney General’s Chambers (AGC) and the Sabah Attorney‑General (SAG), plus a political deal at the Prime Minister-Chief Minister level.

The legal carpentry was 95 per cent done.

The remaining 5 per cent was the drafting and the negotiation.

The alternative isn’t a different system.

The alternative was the same system wearing a different name, presided over by the same people, extracting the same fees, and leaving stateless families keeping savings in gold until the next rainy day and they head for the pawnshop.

Let the drafting begin on the new labour package. Let the negotiations begin. One without the other fails.

New Labour Package Story

This remains the complete story on the new labour package for Sabah. There are no gaps. There’s nothing left out. Let the work begin.

Malaysia, on May Day in 2026, still has no direct‑hire platform for migrant workers.

The proposed Universal Recruitment Advanced Platform (Turap) remains under evaluation. There has been no final decision.

The existing Foreign Workers Centralised Management System (FWCMS), operated by Bestinet, continues. Ironically, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) found that it operated for six years without a signed contract. It had 24 unauthorised super‑admin users.

The policy vacuum wasn’t a problem for Sabah.

It’s an opportunity for designing a legally coherent, territory-led reform that addresses two distinct population:

Migrant Worker And The Stateless

Population A: Cross‑border migrant workers, holding national passports, enter Sabah via the Calling Visa process.

They are not seeking citizenship.

They are seeking fair recruitment, freedom from debt bondage, and compliance with ILO Convention 97 (Migration for Employment) and ILO Convention 29 (Forced Labour), both of which are binding on Malaysia.

Population B: Stateless residents in the form of IMM13 holders, Kad Burung‑Burung and Census Certificate holders, Bajau Laut, and stateless children.

They have no passport, no country for returning and no legal identity.

They are not foreign workers.

They are already here.

They need work document, bank account, birth certificate for their children, and pathway to citizenship for those children having resided 18 years or more in Sabah.

The conflation of these two population has paralysed policy in Sabah and Malaysia since 16 September 1963.

The complete story separates them, respects the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63), and provides a legislative blueprint that distinguishes between foreign workers (who need fair recruitment, not citizenship) and stateless residents (who need legal identity, not voting rights).

It also answers the sovereignty objection head‑on: foreign workers are not seeking citizenship; stateless persons are not foreign workers; granting legal identity for people who have no other home isn’t loss of sovereignty.

It’s the exercise of sovereignty.

Non-Sabahan

Under MA63, Sabah retains control over entry and residence of non‑Sabahans. Section 65 of the Immigration Act 1959/63 provides that no person shall enter Sabah without the consent of the Sabah Government.

The Delegation of Powers (Immigration) Order 2016 (P.U.(A) 309) vests the Sabah Immigration Director with specific powers viz. issue passes and regulate entry.

The Federal Court affirmed in State of Sabah v Government of Malaysia [2 MLJ 114] that this division was constitutionally entrenched.

However, the issuance of work passes was governed by the federal Immigration Regulations 1963, Regulation 11.

Sabah cannot unilaterally invent a new pass class; it must be gazetted by the federal Minister.

The correct formula: Sabah approves the person; Putrajaya creates the pass. Any reform must be joint. Neither level of government can act alone.

Debt Bondage

Population A migrant workers are currently funnelled through FWCMS/Bestinet.

Bestinet, under FWCMS, receives RM537 million annually.

ILO Convention 97 requires equal treatment with nationals; ILO Convention 29 prohibits debt bondage and forced labour.

The current system – with documented debt bondage, fees extracted from workers before arrival, and lack of a signed contract – prima facie violates both conventions.

Twilight Zone

Population B, stateless residents in the twilight zone, fall into several categories:

IMM13 holders have visit pass under Regulation 11(2). It does not authorise employment (Immigration Circular IM.101/HQ‑G/429/1 Vol.4 2021). There are an estimated 100,000‑200,000 IMM13 holders in Sabah.

Kad Burung‑Burung and Census Certificate holders. These, having older documentation, are also stateless. Many are elderly. A deeming provision would ensure that they receive MyKAS or green MyKad (temporary residence).

Bajau Laut. The ESSCOM (Eastern Sabah Security Command) crnsus recorded about 29,000 Bajau Laut, including 6,000 citizens.

There’s biometric data on approximately 27,000 individuals.

Stateless children, born in Sabah, cannot obtain birth certificates without marriage certificates or police reports. They have no legal identity.

Track 1 . . .

Track 1 for Population A requires federal legislative action with Sabah’s consent.

Track 2 . . .

Track 2 applies for Population B. It isn’t about recruitment, it’s about regularising persons already present, many born in Sabah. — NMH

Related internal links . . .

The post New Labour Package For Sabah From Parliament . . . first appeared on NMH.

Commentary And Analysis . . . The media has reported that the government intends “cutting out agents” through a Government‑to‑Government (G2G) model involving employers’ associations, with no private agents for migrant worker recruitment. In Part 1, we saw that subject matter experts were in consensus that there can be no law against direct migrant worker employment by employers and workers.

That policy, if implemented, requires several legal changes.

Direct Migrant Worker

The Immigration Regulations 1963 must be amended for direct migrant worker recruitment, thereby allowing direct Calling Visa applications by employers, without routing through FWCMS.

The existing MoUs with source countries must be terminated or renegotiated; for example, the Malaysia–Indonesia Memorandum of Understanding that mandates the One Channel System would need replacement.

The FWCMS contract held by Bestinet must be terminated or expire – the contract currently runs runs 2028 or 2031; breaking it requires negotiation or compensation, which has fiscal implications.

The Private Employment Agencies Act 1981 does not mandate agents, but the administrative policies that treat agents as the sole channel must be rescinded.

Until these steps are completed, direct hiring for PLKS categories remains illegal. An employer who reads the consensus in the earlier part and acts on it immediately would be committing an offence under section 55B of the Immigration Act.

Consensus Correct

The consensus was correct as a matter of policy but incomplete as a matter of law.

If the government amends the regulations and allows association‑led recruitment, that model would be lawful.

However, the involvement of associations still requires a legal framework: does the employer contract directly with the worker?

Does the association perform the vetting and referral functions of the former agent?

Is the association licensed under any statute?

In Germany’s Triple Win project, a dedicated implementing agency (GIZ) coordinates the process.

Exemption

Malaysia would need issuing a specific exemption under the Private Employment Agencies Act or gazette a new regulation permitting association‑led recruitment.

There should be no law against direct employment by employers and workers.

However, under current Malaysian law – specifically Immigration Regulations 1963 Regulation 11, the mandatory FWCMS system operated by Bestinet, and existing bilateral MoUs with source countries – direct hiring of general foreign workers was effectively illegal and may result in criminal penalties under section 55B of the Immigration Act 1959/63.

Again, for direct hiring, the government must amend the Immigration Regulations, terminate or renegotiate the relevant MoUs, and replace the FWCMS monopoly with a G2G or association‑led system.

Foreign workers must not enter on tourist passes to seek employment; that remains an offence under section 39(b).

A lawful alternative was a G2G system where employers apply directly for Calling Visas, with vetting by employers’ associations and trade unions in both countries.

This model was permitted under ILO Convention 97 and the Trade Unions Act 1959, but would require new regulations for authorising association‑led recruitment without licensed private agents.

Questions

When analysing any consensus on migration or labour law, we must ask:

Does the consensus describe what those involved wishes the law to be, or what the law actually was?

Is there subsidiary legislation, administrative policy, or an international agreement operating beneath the primary statute?

Is source‑country law a limiting factor that cannot be waived by Malaysia alone?

By distinguishing between moral claims (what should be) and positive law (what is), the consensus will be both principled and useful for policymakers and practitioners.

Good law reform advocacy insists on accurate diagnosis before prescription.

The present foreign worker system was nothing but corruption. The workers lose out.

Others Benefit

The consensus was essentially correct as a description of how the system functions in practice.

However, for complete subject matter expert analysis, three important nuances must be added: who the “others” are, what the evidence shows, and how the system became this way.

The consensus was not hyperbole.

The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) found that the Home Ministry issued Bestinet a letter of acceptance before finalising procurement terms, forcing the government to negotiate a fee increase from RM100 to RM215 per worker – a 115 per cent hike.

Bestinet now receives RM537 million per year or RM3.2 billion over six years.

The system operated for six years without a signed contract.

Meanwhile, the Malaysian Anti‑Corruption Commission (MACC) exposed a “counter setting” scam where a senior Immigration officer controlled approximately 50 officers and agents, with corrupt officers grossing millions annually. MACC seized RM800,000 from just two junior immigration officers’ homes.

The consensus was correct but incomplete.

Others

Bestinet: Founded by a Bangladeshi national granted Malaysian permanent residency, who, according to Bloomberg, selected the 10 Bangladeshi agencies from over 1,000, while political handlers managed the politics.

Bangladeshi agents: At least one worker paid US$4,400; UN experts report fees exceeding official rates by over five times; workers pay up to RM25,000 through debt, often for jobs that do not exist.

Cartel partners: A UN experts report notes “a small number of recruitment agencies operate as a closed syndicate sustained by corruption”.

Rogue employers: Issued quotas for non‑existent jobs, leaving stranded workers “jobless, unpaid, homeless, and at constant risk of arrest”.

Documentation

How “workers lose out” was documented.

Over 100,646 PLKS holders in construction alone became “untraceable” after a legalisation programme.

Eight Bangladeshis were coerced into forced labour in Gua Musang for up to seven months.

One worker, Shofiqul Islam, borrowed $4,400 for a construction job, his employer vanished, and he later died in a derelict building outside Kuala Lumpur.

Global Slavery

The Global Slavery Index ranks Malaysia 12th highest in the Asia‑Pacific for modern slavery, with 6.3 affected per 1,000 people – up from 4.2 in 2016.

The US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report maintains Malaysia at Tier 2, acknowledging that root causes “such as exploitative recruitment systems, debt bondage, and weak monitoring” remain unaddressed.

The present foreign worker system was structured for extracting maximum value from workers through systemic corruption that enriches a cartel of politically connected vendors, recruitment agents, and complicit officials at every level – while workers enter deeper into debt bondage, face widespread exploitation, and have no meaningful recourse.

The UN experts summarise it well: “We are deeply troubled that fraudulent recruitment and the exploitation of migrants remain widespread and systematic in Malaysia.”

The National Action Plan on Forced Labour nears its end with limited progress; “by some measures, the problem has worsened”.

The consensus was not an exaggeration. It is a concise description of a system that has been formally documented as broken. — NMH

The post Direct Migrant Worker Recruitment: Malaysia Needs Specific Exemption Under Act first appeared on NMH.

Commentary And Analysis . . . Subject matter experts including the legal fraternity are in consensus that there can be no law in Malaysia against direct migrant worker employment by employers and workers.

Foreign workers can either come here and get a job or employers can visit worker‑surplus countries and hire workers directly.

Employers Associations, Workers Associations, and unions in both countries can be involved.

The philosophical foundation on the consensus, it can be conceded, was sound.

Under Article 6 of the Federal Constitution, there’s no slavery or forced labour, which implies that employers and workers should be free to contract.

The Contracts Act 1950 does not forbid direct hiring.

Direct Hiring

Direct hiring already exists legally for certain categories. MDEC, Petronas, and universities hire expatriates directly under the Expatriate Services Division (ESD) system without agents.

The Private Employment Agencies Act 1981 (Act 246) regulates agents; it does not mandate them. Direct hiring was not inherently illegal under law in Malaya.

The consensus was also correct that employers’ associations, workers’ associations, and unions can be involved.

Malaysia has ratified ILO Convention 97 on Migration for Employment, which encourages cooperation between employers’ and workers’ organisations in migration matters.

For example, the MTUC–KSBSI Memorandum of Understanding of 2019 already conducts pre‑departure briefings for Indonesian workers.

The Trade Unions Act 1959 and the Industrial Relations Act 1967 permit such involvement in recruitment and welfare matters.

The Germany–Indonesia Triple Win project – where German employers, Indonesian nursing unions, and GIZ cooperate without private agents – demonstrates that association‑led recruitment was both permissible and superior.

The consensus was not only legally permissible but represents best international practice.

Direct Migrant Worker Employment Wrong In Law

If the consensus had stopped at “There should be no law against direct employment”, it would have been a legitimate policy position. But it asserts that “there can be no law” – as a factual matter of existing legal reality.

That’s where it goes wrong.

First, there are laws that block direct hiring for general foreign workers.

Immigration Regulations 1963 Regulation 11 requires that employers apply for a Visa Dengan Rujukan (VDR) or Calling Visa through an approved source‑country system.

Since 2016, that system has been the Foreign Worker Centralised Management System (FWCMS), operated by the private vendor Bestinet.

No one cannot bypass FWCMS.

The 2018 Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Human Resources (KSM) for PLKS workers in manufacturing, construction, plantation, services, and agriculture requires that employers use licensed agents or FWCMS; direct applications are rejected.

Undocumented Workers

No plantation manager can visit Lombok and bring back workers directly tomorrow. The manager will be charged under section 55B of the Immigration Act 1959/63, which penalises the employment of undocumented workers.

A fine between RM10,000 and RM50,000 per illegal worker applies where proper procedures were not followed.

The consensus ignores existing subsidiary legislation and administrative policy backed by criminal sanctions.

Second, the consensus that “workers can come here and get a job” was illegal under current law.

Section 6(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1959/63 provides that no person shall enter Malaysia without a pass or visa stating the purpose of entry.

Social Visit Pass

Social visit pass holders cannot seek or accept employment.

Section 39(b) makes working on a social visit pass an offence punishable by a fine which can reach RM10,000 or imprisonment for 12 months, or both.

The system requires a valid job offer before entry, obtained through the Calling Visa process. That’s precisely why agents exist for creating the paper trail before arrival. The literal reading of the consensus would counsel a worker to commit a criminal offence.

Third, the consensus that “employers can visit worker‑surplus countries and hire workers directly” was blocked by source‑country law.

Indonesia’s Law No. 18 of 2017 on the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers, for example, expressly prohibits direct hiring of Indonesian workers by foreign employers without the involvement of licensed Indonesian placement agencies (PPTKIS).

The Philippines’ POEA rules similarly ban direct hiring.

Even if Malaysia amends all its laws tomorrow for direct hiring, Jakarta will stop the worker at the airport.

A Malaysian employer cannot override the sovereign law of another state.

The consensus treats Indonesia and Bangladesh as passive recipients of Malaysian policy, ignoring their own statutory frameworks and enforcement mechanisms.

The consensus implies that there’s a system which must be removed, but it does not explain why the system was put in place. Agent intermediation was mandated after the 1990s for several reasons.

Fraud

First, documentation fraud: before FWCMS, employers submitted fake demand letters.

Workers arrived, found no jobs, and became undocumented. Agents were mandated as gatekeepers for verifation of genuine demand and quota.

Second, debt bondage prevention: source‑country agencies cap recruitment fees.

This has failed in practice, but it was the stated purpose of mandating intermediation. Direct hiring can result in illegal salary deductions; the Employment Act 1955, section 24, limits deductions, but enforcement was weak.

Third, recalibration and amnesty control: the Home Ministry uses agents for tracking numbers and controlling the migrant population. In 2023, there were approximately 1.7 million active PLKS holders. The Ministry claims that without agents, runaway workers cannot be traced.

Fourth, foreign policy and rent‑seeking: MoUs on labour recruitment are tied with diplomatic and trade arrangements.

For example, the Bangladesh labour quota was linked with purchases of palm oil and rice.

Agents are often politically connected in both countries; removing them disrupts rent‑seeking networks that underpin bilateral economic relations.

Recruiting Agents

The 2021 Malaysia–Bangladesh Memorandum of Understanding on worker recruitment, effective for five years, specifically contemplates the role of recruiting agencies.

The 2022 Malaysia–Indonesia Memorandum of Understanding requires the use of the One Channel System, which mandates Indonesian and Malaysian recruitment agencies.

These are not merely administrative policies; they are international agreements given domestic effect under Malaysian law. The consensus therefore does not merely challenge a ministry guideline; it would require Malaysia breaching treaty obligations. — NMH

In Part 2, we look at whether the Immigration Regulations 1963 must be amended for direct migrant worker recruitment.

The post Direct Migrant Worker Recruitment Disallowed In Malaysia first appeared on NMH.

As a seasoned Boeing 737 Captain, Captain Khairulirwan’s story is one deeply rooted in family inspiration. Growing up with a father who was also a retired captain, aviation was more than just a career path, it was a legacy. Watching his father’s dedication to the profession ignited a passion in him from an early age, shaping the path he proudly follows today.

“My father was my greatest inspiration,” Captain Khairulirwan shared. “Seeing his commitment and hearing his experiences motivated me to pursue this career and continue striving for excellence.”

Recalling his first experience in the cockpit of a Boeing 737, Captain Khairulirwan described it as both exhilarating and intimidating.

“It was exciting, but at the same time, scary,” he said. “The responsibility was immense, and I knew I had a lot to learn.”

That Defining Milestone

Despite the initial nerves, that moment became a defining milestone. Through years of rigorous training, continuous learning, and unwavering perseverance, Captain Khairulirwan honed his skills and grew into the accomplished pilot he is today.

Like many aspiring aviators, his training journey was not without challenges. One of the biggest obstacles he faced was entering the field without prior aviation experience or foundational knowledge.

“The challenge was adapting to something completely new,” he explained. “You need to learn quickly, stay focused, and never stop improving.”

When it comes to ensuring safety and maintaining composure during unexpected situations in flight, Captain Khairulirwan emphasizes the importance of preparation and training.

“Pilots are trained to manage situations professionally,” he said. “Whenever something unusual happens, there are procedures to follow. Training prepares us to stay calm, think clearly, and prioritize safety at all times.”

For Captain Khairulirwan, discipline, focus, passion, and strong financial support are essential qualities for anyone aspiring to become a pilot.

Demanding But Rewarding

“Passion will drive you, discipline will shape you, and focus will keep you on course.

“Aviation is demanding, but for those who truly love it, the journey is incredibly rewarding.”

Among his favorite destinations to fly are Paris and various parts of Europe, destinations he enjoys for their beauty and unique experiences. However, one view remains especially unforgettable, witnessing the sunrise over Cape Town, South Africa, from the cockpit.

“The view during sunrise in Cape Town is truly breathtaking,” he recalled. “Moments like that remind you how extraordinary this career can be.”

Retirement

Throughout his remarkable career, Captain Khairulirwan holds two moments especially close to his heart: earning his title as Captain after years of hard work and intensive training, and witnessing his father’s retirement from the airline industry.

“Becoming a captain was one of my proudest achievements,” he said. “But seeing my father retire after his own incredible journey was equally meaningful. It felt like a full-circle moment.”

After 25 years in aviation, Captain Khairulirwan continues to embrace the skies with the same passion that first inspired him as a child. His journey is a powerful testament to dedication, resilience, and the enduring influence of family.

This World Pilots’ Day, Captain Khairulirwan Kamaruddin stands as a symbol of excellence in aviation honoring not only the profession, but also the legacy of those who inspire future generations to dream, train, and soar. – NMH

The post World Pilots’ Day: Cockpit Talk Inside the Boeing 737 first appeared on NMH.

Sarawak is intensifying its preparations for APRC 2028, a regional platform centred on respiratory health, by fostering stronger collaboration between government, academia and industry.

At a recent high-level engagement in Kuching, stakeholders came together to align efforts in support of the upcoming event, which is expected to spotlight pressing public health challenges, including lung disease and tuberculosis, while strengthening regional cooperation. The session reflects Sarawak’s broader ambition—not only to host a successful APRC 2028, but to leverage it as a catalyst for long-term healthcare capacity building.

Held at the office of Sarawak Deputy Premier, Datuk Amar Dr. Sim Kui Hian, the meeting brought together representatives from medical institutions, higher education bodies and industry partners, highlighting a unified approach to addressing lung disease and tuberculosis through integrated strategies.

Sarawak Aligns Healthcare and Talent Development for APRC 2028

Central to the discussions was the need to strengthen expertise and capabilities in respiratory health, particularly in tackling tuberculosis, which remains a significant public health concern across the region.

Sarawak has been steadily advancing its healthcare ecosystem, with increasing emphasis on training, research and cross-sector collaboration. In the lead-up to APRC 2028, efforts are being made to ensure that healthcare professionals, researchers and support systems are equipped with the knowledge and tools needed to address evolving challenges in lung health.

This includes closer collaboration between universities, training institutions and healthcare providers to develop talent pipelines that are both specialised and responsive to real-world needs.

Human Impact: Strengthening Communities Through Better Care

Beyond institutional collaboration, the focus on lung health and tuberculosis carries a deeply human dimension.

For patients and communities, improved awareness, early detection and better access to care can significantly enhance quality of life and reduce disease burden. Initiatives linked to APRC 2028 are expected to play a role in amplifying public health education, while also encouraging more proactive health-seeking behaviours.

For healthcare practitioners, the platform offers opportunities to exchange knowledge, share best practices and strengthen regional networks—ultimately improving standards of care.

These efforts collectively underscore a people-first approach, where healthcare outcomes are not just measured in statistics, but in lives improved and communities strengthened.

Building a Lasting Public Health Legacy

As Sarawak prepares for APRC 2028, the focus extends beyond hosting responsibilities to building a sustainable and resilient healthcare ecosystem.

The engagement highlights how strategic collaboration can drive meaningful progress—bringing together policy direction, academic expertise and industry innovation to tackle complex health challenges.

By placing lung health and tuberculosis at the centre of its efforts, Sarawak is not only contributing to regional dialogue, but also reinforcing its commitment to public health advancement.

In doing so, APRC 2028 is set to become more than just a regional event—it represents an opportunity to create lasting impact, positioning Sarawak as a leader in collaborative healthcare solutions. – NMH

The post Sarawak Advances APRC 2028 Preparations with Focus on Respiratory Health first appeared on NMH.

Commentary And Analysis . . . The Negeri Sembilan Constitution, under the BFD (Basic Features Doctrine) which permeates the Federal Constitution, cannot be amended on the Four Undang. They, based on Adat as the first law in international law, exist.

Negeri Sembilan’s system exists because Orang Asli luak — autonomous river territories – – needed chiefs, Minangkabau migrants needed legitimacy, and four of those chiefs decided to hire a king in 1773.

The Undang are older than the monarchy.

The monarchy is older than the state constitution.

Emergency

The Orang Asli are older than all of them.

In 2026, all three histories are colliding in one Dewan opening.

Negeri Sembilan …

That’s why the crisis involving the Negeri Sembilan Assembly looks unsolvable: the wiring has three eras in it. Orang Asli territorial adat from 1300, Minangkabau elective kingship from 1773, and British written constitution from 1957. They don’t always agree.

Why This Matters for the 2026 Crisis.

Undang . . .

When the four Undang claimed on 19 April 2026 that they could “depose” Tuanku Muhriz Tuanku Munawir they were invoking the oldest logic in the system: the Undang created the Yamtuan in 1773, so the Undang can uncreate him.

When Menteri Besar (MB) Datuk Seri Aminuddin Harun claimed Undang Mubarak was removed 17 April, he was invoking the modern constitutional logic: only DKU can remove an Undang, and the YDPA Besar chairs the DKU (Dewan Keadilan dan Undang).

Both are pulling on different strands of the same rope. The Minangkabau strand says Undang are kingmakers. The constitutional strand says DKU is supreme. The Orang Asli strand underneath says power comes from the luak, not from the palace or the MB’s office.

March Of History

How Negeri Sembilan’s System Originated — and Why It’s in “Orang Asli Country”.

Negeri Sembilan’s adat and constitutional system didn’t start with the Minangkabau. It started with the Orang Asli. The four Undang system is a Minangkabau overlay on a much older Orang Asli political order.

Based on historical research, here’s how it happened.

Before Minangkabau . . .

Before the Minangkabau: Orang Asli luak

From roughly 1000–1400 CE, the interior of what’s now Negeri Sembilan was settled by Temuan and Semelai Orang Asli. They didn’t have King. They had luak. Each luak was run by a Batin or Penghulu chosen by custom from senior families. Disputes were settled by muafakat (consensus) in a balai. Land was communal, matrilineal, and passed through women.

These luak covered the valleys of the Linggi, Muar, and Serting rivers. The names survive today: Sungei Ujong, Jelebu, Johol, Rembau. Those four were the largest and most organised Orang Asli luak. They already had chiefs, boundaries, and councils before any outsiders arrived.

After Minangkabau . . .

Minangkabau Migration: 1400s–1600s

Minangkabau from Sumatra began migrating across the Melaka Straits from the 15th century, especially after the fall of Melaka in 1511. They moved inland to escape Portuguese/Johor control and because the interior was good for paddy and tin.

They found Orang Asli already living in organised luak.

Instead of conquest, they did what Minangkabau do: merantau and assimilate.

Minangkabau also practiced matrilineal adat, Adat Perpatih, which matched Orang Asli custom. Marriage between Minangkabau men and Orang Asli women was common. Over two to three generations, the ruling families of the four luak became Minangkabau by culture and language, but their authority derived from the original Orang Asli territorial structure.

That’s why the titles “Undang” are not royal.

They’re territorial chiefs. “Undang” comes from undang-undang viz. the one who upholds the law of the luak. The chief’s power came from the suku in the valley, not from a sultan.

Why Negeri Sembilan Needed a Ruler: 1773 . . .

By the 1700s the four luak kept fighting each other and were being raided by Bugis and Johor. No luak chief could claim supremacy over the others because Adat Perpatih rejects central kingship. But they needed external legitimacy to deal with Johor, Selangor, and the Dutch.

So in 1773 the four Undang sent envoys to Pagaruyung in Minangkabau, Sumatra, and asked for a prince of royal blood to become their Yamtuan. Pagaruyung sent Raja Melewar. He landed at Penajis in Rembau.

The deal was explicit: the Undang elect the Yamtuan, and the Yamtuan rules only with their consent. He could not own land, tax at will, or appoint chiefs. He was a referee and foreign minister, not an absolute monarch. That contract became the basis of Negeri Sembilan’s constitution. It’s still there in 2026.

This is why Negeri Sembilan is the only state with an elective monarchy. The Undang predate the Ruler by 300+ years. The Ruler exists because the Undang created the job.

Orang Asli In The System . . .

After Raja Melewar, the Minangkabau aristocracy slowly marginalised the Orang Asli.

By British times, 1874–1895, the British recognised the four Undang as the “Malay chiefs” and ignored the Orang Asli Batin. The Orang Asli became anak buah — subjects — in their own ancestral luak.

But the structure still carries Orang Asli DNA:
Matrilineal adat: Both Temuan and Minangkabau pass clan and land through women.

That’s why Negeri Sembilan’s Adat Perpatih is matrilineal while the rest of Malaya is patrilineal Adat Temenggung.

Luak boundaries: Sungei Ujong, Jelebu, Johol, Rembau follow the old Orang Asli river territories. The names are pre-Minangkabau.

Election principle: Orang Asli Batin were chosen by mufakat of elders. The Undang are still elected by the Lembaga and Buapak of each luak, not appointed by the Ruler. That’s a direct survival.

No divine kingship: Orang Asli had no daulat.

Minangkabau Adat Perpatih also rejects daulat.

So Negeri Sembilan’s Yamtuan has no daulat — he’s “Yang di-Pertuan Besar,” the one made great by the people, not “Sultan,” the one with power from God.

British Reshaping: 1874–1957 . . .

The British cemented the Undang system because it suited Indirect Rule. The 1898 Jelebu succession dispute went to the British Resident. The 1948 Federation Agreement and 1957 NS Constitution wrote the four Undang + Tunku Besar Tampin + YDPA Besar into law as the Dewan Keadilan dan Undang (DKU).

The British also stripped the Orang Asli of political status.

Under the Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954, Batin became welfare officers, not chiefs.

The “Orang Asli country” in Negeri Sembilan has a Malay adat system built on top of it, with the Orang Asli politically underneath. — NMH

The post Negeri Sembilan: Emergency Cannot Remove Four Undang first appeared on NMH.